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How the United States Government Sacrifices 
Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of 
National Prestige 
Dionne L. Koller 
Abstract: This Article is about the United States Government 
trading off athletes’ constitutional rights in the pursuit of national 
prestige through sport. The Olympic Movement has for decades provided 
an incentive for governments of all ideologies to use elite athletes to 
enhance national prestige or demonstrate national supremacy. This 
phenomenon is commonly known as “sportive nationalism.” Unlike 
countries such as the former East Germany and Soviet Union, the 
United States Government has not readily acknowledged its own 
practice of sportive nationalism, preferring instead to assert that 
Olympic Movement sport in the United States is a private endeavor. 
This Article, however, demonstrates that the United States has in fact 
practiced its own brand of sportive nationalism—previously as a foreign 
policy tool during the Cold War and today as part of the worldwide 
fight against athletic doping. This Article explains that the practice of 
United States sportive nationalism is accomplished through the United 
States Olympic Committee and now the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency, both of which serve as “private” Olympic Movement regulators. 
This private sector status of sport regulation in the United States has 
created a significant accountability vacuum so that manifestations of 
sportive nationalism that threaten athletes’ eligibility, like the war on 
doping, largely go unchecked. As a result, athletes’ constitutional liberty 
and property interests are threatened because there is no incentive to 
give, and in fact athletes are not given meaningful due process 
protections to protect their eligibility. Accordingly, this Article argues 
that steps should be taken to promote greater accountability for sportive 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thanks to Dean 
Philip Closius for his generous support of this Article. Thanks also to Bryan Davis and 
Matthew Kneeland for outstanding assistance with research, and Keith Blair, Evan Buxner, 
Amy Dillard, Michele Gilman, Leigh Goodmark, Margaret Johnson, Robert Lande, Michael 
Meyerson, Nancy Modesitt, Connie O’Keefe, Amy Sloan, and Adam Todd for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
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nationalism in the United States Olympic Movement, so that the 
athletes who serve to enhance our nation’s prestige do not risk their due 
process rights in the process. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s, against the backdrop of the Cold War, the United 
States Government began to engage in a practice known as “sportive 
nationalism,” taking and supporting actions that use Olympic 
Movement1 sport and individual athletes’ sporting success to 
demonstrate the United States’ supremacy on the world stage. From 
a legal standpoint, the United States Government’s practice of 
sportive nationalism was benign in terms of its effect on athletes’ 
constitutional rights. The government typically took actions that 
supported success in Olympic Movement competition—a position 
that easily aligned with athletes’ pursuit of their sporting careers. 
Moreover, Cold War Era athletes, pursuing their sport as an 
avocation, did not have a claim of entitlement in their eligibility that 
would trigger constitutional due process protections. Today, 
however, the government’s practice of sportive nationalism, and 
sportive nationalism’s cost to athletes, has changed dramatically. The 
government no longer simply uses success in Olympic Movement 
competition to promote national prestige, but instead uses the 
punishment of individual athletes and termination of their athletic 
eligibility2 to achieve this same end. This action comes at a time 
when athletes can make a convincing claim that their athletic careers 
are entitled to constitutional due process protection. 
Consider the case of Floyd Landis, the 2006 Tour de France 
champion and long-time elite cyclist. After his dramatic comeback in 
Stage 17 of the Tour, it was announced that Landis tested positive 
for exogenous testosterone, and the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency (“USADA”) subsequently charged him with a doping 
 
 1. The Olympic Movement is comprised of athletes, organizations, and others who 
agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter and to adhere to the regulations of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), recognized International Federations of Sport (IFs) 
and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs). 
 2. This punitive action plays out through anti-doping initiatives taken by the United 
States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), a nominally private entity that is substantially funded 
and logistically aided by the United States Government. 
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offense.3 The French lab that tested Landis and claimed to have 
gotten a positive result4 was the same one that had unsuccessfully 
accused Lance Armstrong of doping during his run as a seven-time 
Tour champion.5 Landis vehemently denied the charges and sought 
arbitration. Despite finding multiple errors in the lab’s handling and 
testing of Landis’s sample and other inconsistencies that the panel 
found “troubl[ing]” and amounting to “sloppy practice[s],”6 the 
arbitration panel ruled 2–1 that Landis had committed a doping 
offense.7 The dissenting arbitrator stated that “the documents 
supplied by [the lab] are so filled with errors that they do not 
support” a finding that Landis was doping.8 “Mr. Landis,” stated the 
arbitrator, “should be found innocent.”9 Nevertheless, Landis was 
banned from cycling for a period of two years and was stripped of 
the 2006 Tour de France title.10 Landis asserts that the loss of 
eligibility cost him $5 to $10 million in endorsements and other 
income and cost about $2 million in legal fees.11 
Other lower-profile cases illustrate the same degree of 
questionable justice. For instance, swimmer Kicker Vencill was a 
victim of tainted supplements. He tested positive but was able to 
prove that the multi-vitamins he had taken were contaminated. 
Nevertheless, he was found guilty of a doping offense and given the 
same two-year ban from competition as athletes who were found to 
have intentionally doped.12  
 
 3. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 4 (Sept. 20, 
2007). 
 4. Id. at 46 (identifying Laboratoire National de Dépistage et du Dopage (LNDD) as 
the laboratory that obtained positive test results showing that Landis had used testosterone).  
 5. A Dutch investigation later exonerated Armstrong and stated that the “[World-Anti 
Doping Agency] and the LNDD may have ‘behaved in ways that are completely inconsistent 
with the rules and regulations of international anti-doping control testing.’” Arthur Max, 
Report Exonerates Armstrong of Doping, BREITBART, May 31, 2006, http:// 
www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8HUPHU00&show_article=1. 
 6. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06 at 77–81. 
 7. Id. at 83–84. 
 8. Id. at 1 (Campbell, Arb., dissenting). 
 9. Id. Campbell also stressed that Landis demonstrated through expert testimony that 
the results produced by the lab did “not comport with known science.” Id. at 18–19. 
 10. Id. at 83. 
 11. Jim Caple, Pounding the Pedals with Floyd Landis, ESPN, July 16, 2007, available at 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=caple/070713. 
 12. Michael Hiltzik, Presumed Guilty: Athletes’ Unbeatable Foe, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2006, at A1. 
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Despite these devastating individual outcomes, the United States 
Government does not view these cases as injustices. Indeed, for the 
government, such cases provide a more significant international 
relations benefit than if the athletes had won Olympic gold medals, 
because in today’s Olympic Movement, sanctioning athletes and 
stripping them of their eligibility is what burnishes the United States’ 
international image.13 This Article explains, however, that the image 
enhancement achieved by using athletes in this way can directly 
collide with athletes’ constitutional rights, as there is little incentive 
for the government to provide due process protections to athletes 
whose eligibility is threatened. On the contrary, the incentive is to 
trade off athletes’ rights to secure national prestige. This 
phenomenon, illustrated by the United States’ response to elite 
athlete doping, provides an opportunity to begin the dialogue of 
how best to regulate the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) 
and United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) to achieve 
accountability for sportive nationalism that infringes on athletes’ 
constitutional rights. 
Part I of this Article explains the practice of sportive nationalism 
and its place in the Olympic Movement. Part II looks at earlier 
manifestations of sportive nationalism in the United States, 
explaining how the Amateur Sports Act structured the United States 
Olympic Movement in a way that subverted athletes’ rights to the 
national interest, setting the stage for the threats to individual rights 
that have occurred in the recent fight against elite athlete doping. 
 
 13. Amy Shipley, Doping Divide May Taint Olympics, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at 
E01. 
[I]n the matter of anti-doping, perception matters. Countries that haven’t adopted a 
hard line on the issue and whose athletes perform exceptionally well at major 
competitions might find the results greeted with skepticism. . . .  
. . . Police actions in the United States in the last five years have resulted in sanctions 
or the threat of sanctions against more than a dozen athletes and helped restore the 
country’s reputation on anti-doping matters.  
“For so long, we were thought of as the biggest cheaters in the world,” said Scott 
Burns, deputy director for state and local affairs at the White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy. 
Id.; see also Vicki Michaelis, BALCO Creates Inquiry Road Map, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2006, at 
3C (quoting Scott Burns, Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, on 
the effect of “catching” Floyd Landis and Justin Gatlin: “[T]he world looked at the United 
States as one of the worst (doping) offenders.” Exposing the fact that the two athletes used 
performance-enhancing substances “helps our image. . . . I have seen literally a 180-degree 
turn in the last two or three years with respect to our reputation.”). 
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Part III looks at United States sportive nationalism in a new light, 
through the experiences of the anti-doping movement, and explains 
what is at stake when the government’s practice of sportive 
nationalism becomes inconsistent with athletes’ pursuit of their 
sporting careers. This part explains that the nature of elite sport has 
changed so that an argument can be made that athletes have a 
constitutional liberty and property interest in their sporting careers. 
This part further explains that in some cases, the anti-doping 
movement as an expression of sportive nationalism can threaten 
athletes’ constitutional rights. Finally, Part IV will describe proposals 
for achieving greater accountability in the United States Olympic 
Movement to prevent abuses of athletes’ constitutional rights in the 
name of national prestige.  
I. OLYMPIC MOVEMENT SPORT AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
To understand how athletes’ constitutional rights could be 
threatened by the government’s use of Olympic Movement sport as 
part of a broader foreign policy agenda, it is helpful first to 
understand how nations are tempted to use elite sport in the pursuit 
of international relations goals. This temptation has been well-
documented in social science literature for decades and is referred to 
as “sportive nationalism.” Sportive nationalism has been defined as 
“the use of elite athletes by governments to demonstrate national 
fitness and vitality for the purpose of enhancing national prestige.”14 
Sportive nationalism is a practice that is ubiquitous,15 as nations have 
 
 14. John Hoberman, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 
WORKSHOP, RESEARCH ON DOPING IN SPORT 7 (2001) Nor. [hereinafter Hoberman, 
WORKSHOP]; see also Alan Bairner, Sportive Nationalism and Nationalist Politics: A 
Comparative Analysis of Scotland, the Republic of Ireland and Sweden, 20 J. SPORT & SOC. 
ISSUES 314, 315 (1996) (“Existing nation-states have been shown to use sport for a variety of 
purposes such as enhancing prestige . . . .”); John Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails: The 
Politics of Doping Control, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE 
OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 241, 260 (Wayne Wilson & Edward Derse eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
Hoberman, Doping] (defining sportive nationalism as “the familiar doctrine that elite athletes 
are a significant index of a nation’s vitality”). 
 15. RICHARD ESPY, THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 4 (1979) (“All states use 
sport as a diplomatic tool . . . .”); Hoberman, WORKSHOP, supra note 14, at 7, 9 (stating that 
“to the best of my knowledge, no sitting government has ever renounced sportive nationalism 
as its fundamental approach to international athletic competition,” and that “sportive 
nationalism continues to prevail as national policy around the world”); MARTIN BARRY 
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discovered that athletic success, particularly within the Olympic 
Movement, furthers the national interest.16 Although it is not 
inherently wrong, sportive nationalism provides a tempting way for 
nations to make foreign policy points and gain national prestige 
because elite sport can provide a high-profile public relations 
payoff.17 
Sport has two valuable functions for a nation. First, sport can be 
a powerful force for nationalism domestically, among a nation’s own 
people.18 Second, sport can be used to enhance a nation’s prestige 
and demonstrate supremacy in the world order.19 James Nafziger and 
Andrew Strenk have identified six specific political uses of 
international elite athletic competition “by nation-states: diplomatic 
recognition and non-recognition, protest, ideology and propaganda, 
official prestige, international cooperation, and conflict.”20 These 
political uses of sport reflect the fact that “instrumentalist” 
perceptions of sport are what drive most nations to sponsor national 
sporting programs, in that very few, if any, nations value sport simply 
for the sake of sport.21 As would be expected, the practice of sportive 
nationalism plays out most clearly through the Olympic Games.22 
 
VINOKUR, MORE THAN A GAME: SPORTS AND POLITICS 111 (1988) (“[G]overnments and 
countries throughout the world—regardless of political system—now seem to recognize that 
international sports victories have a new political meaning.”). 
 16. ESPY, supra note 15, at viii (“[T]he nations of the world have interpreted 
participation in the Games as an opportunity to express national identification.”); James A.R. 
Nafziger, Legal Aspects of a United States Foreign Sports Policy, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 
838 (1975); Maria Tai Wolff, Note, Playing By the Rules? A Legal Analysis of the United States 
Olympic Committee—Soviet Olympic Committee Doping Control Agreement, 25 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 611, 620 (1989) (“[T]he Olympics provide a highly visible international forum for the 
expression of a political message.”). See generally Peter J. Beck, ‘The Most Effective Means of 
Communication in the Modern World’? British Sport and National Prestige, in SPORT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 78 (Roger Levermore & Adrian 
Budd eds., 2004); James A.R. Nafziger & Andrew Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of 
Sports, 10 CONN. L. REV. 259 (1977). 
 17. See VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 126 (citing the example of the 1980 Moscow 
Olympic boycott, and explaining that the real reason for the boycott “was Carter’s need for a 
bold public relations stroke”). 
 18. Bairner, supra note 14, at 314. This Article will focus on the use of sport for 
international relations purposes and the domestic legal concerns this raises. 
 19. ESPY, supra note 15, at 7; Beck, supra note 16, at 78 (noting sports “propaganda 
potential” for reflecting, enhancing and diminishing a nation’s international prestige); 
Nafziger, supra note 16, at 839–40. 
 20. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 261. 
 21. Barrie Houlihan, Building an International Regime to Combat Doping in Sport, in 
SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 74–75 (Roger 
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Sportive nationalism takes different forms in different nations, 
“depending on the nature of the government that seeks prestige 
benefits from international sporting success.”23 Traditionally, 
sportive nationalism has played an important role in the political life 
of Communist, totalitarian regimes.24 One of the most infamous 
examples of this is the conduct of the former East Germany, which 
aggressively used sport as a tool to achieve its foreign policy goals.25 
As it was in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc 
countries, the government was in total control of the nation’s sports 
system, which operated with a “[w]in at [a]ll [c]osts” mentality.26 
The goal was to show the world that its system of government was 
 
Levermore & Adrian Budd eds., 2004); see also William J. Morgan, Sports and the Making of 
National Identities: A Moral View, 24 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 3 (1997) (“[N]ations are dependent 
upon the international sports world to confirm their national stature. . . . The establishment of 
an international athletic presence is not, therefore, a gratuitous matter for nations, but rather 
the path they must currently follow if they expect to be treated as a nation.”). 
 22. ALAN TOMLINSON & CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL 
SPORTS EVENTS (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 2006); Jeffrey M. Marks, Political Abuse of Olympic 
Sport, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 155, 158 (1982) (noting that the Olympic Charter rule 1 
describes the key aims of the Olympic Movement as promoting Olympic ideals and creating 
international goodwill); id. at 159 (discussing rule nine of the Charter which specifies that “the 
Games are contests between individuals and not between countries.”); see ESPY, supra note 15; 
Houlihan, supra note 21, at 74–75 (“Over the last 40 years many, indeed most, of the major 
sporting states have, at worst, ruthlessly exploited international sport in general and the 
Olympic Games in particular for a variety of ideological and nationalistic purposes . . . . [F]ew 
states have been prepared to value sport for its intrinsic qualities . . . .”); Wolff, supra note 16, 
at 622 (explaining that former USOC Vice President George Steinbrenner’s comments on the 
United States’ performance in the Olympic Games illustrates that “prestige in Olympic 
competition is somehow linked to its prestige among world powers: winning Olympic 
countries are winning countries”); see also Olympic Charter Chap. 5 § 51(3) (prohibiting any 
“kind of demonstration or political, religious, or racial propaganda . . . in any Olympic . . . 
areas”). Many commentators have pointed out that despite these lofty ideals, the Olympic 
Games have always been a potent force to promote nationalism. See generally STEPHEN WAGG 
& DAVID L. ANDREWS, EAST PLAYS WEST: SPORT AND THE COLD WAR (2007). 
 23. Hoberman, Doping, supra note 14, at 315–16. 
 24. There are, of course, examples of sportive nationalism outside of the former Soviet 
Bloc, such as with Hitler’s use of the 1936 Olympic Games as a Nazi propaganda vehicle. See 
ROB BEAMISH & IAN RITCHIE, FASTEST, HIGHEST, STRONGEST: A CRITIQUE OF HIGH-
PERFORMANCE SPORT 32 (2006). However, the Soviet Union and East Germany had the 
most sustained and developed system of using elite athletes to enhance national prestige. 
 25. VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 59; Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 262 (“The 
German Democratic Republic has used sports to gain diplomatic recognition more aggressively 
and successfully than any country in the world.” East Germany worked “to use sport as a lever 
to remove the barriers which isolated them from the [W]estern [W]orld.”). 
 26. VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 98. 
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superior27 and to gain acceptance as part of the international 
community.28 As part of this pursuit, the government funded and 
administered sophisticated training programs to develop elite 
athletes. It built sports facilities, enlisted the best coaches, physicians 
and scientists, and provided athletes with financial and material 
rewards for athletic success.29 It was long suspected, and later 
confirmed, that this government-sponsored training program 
included the systematic administration of performance enhancing 
substances, such as anabolic steroids, to many of its male and female 
athletes in order to increase the athletes’ effectiveness in world-class 
competition.30 As a result of its comprehensive sports program, East 
Germany achieved enormous success in Olympic Movement 
competition. By 1971, East Germany’s athletes had won 83 Olympic 
medals, 611 world championship medals, and 983 European 
championship medals.31 In 1976, with a population just over sixteen 
million, East Germany won nearly the same share of Olympic medals 
as the United States, which at that time had a population over 
eighteen times larger.32 A former East German official credited 
success in sport with helping to obtain international recognition for 
East Germany, stating that “sport led the way in increasing the 
international prestige of our Socialist republic and led to its 
diplomatic recognition by a majority of the states of the world.”33 
Indeed, from 1971–1973, East Germany was given diplomatic 
recognition by ninety countries.34 Similarly, the Soviet Union used 
international athletic competition to great political advantage, 
“link[ing] the victories of its athletes with the claimed superiority of 
 
 27. Id. at 88. 
 28. Id.; see also ESPY, supra note 15, at 32–35. 
 29. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 263. 
 30. BEAMISH & RITCHIE, supra note 24, at 86; Hoberman, Doping, supra note 14, at 
257 (“[There is now] incontrovertible proof of the systematic steroid doping of former East 
German Olympic champions and world record holders”); Houlihan, supra note 21, at 64 
(describing East Germany and the Soviet Union as “subversives” within the early movements 
to combat doping in sport, and explaining that in both nations “state-organized doping was 
firmly established behind a public front of pompous condemnation of drug use as contrary to 
the spirit of Olympism and a problem confined to the commercialized West”). 
 31. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 264. 
 32. VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 83–84. 
 33. Id. at 59. 
 34. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 264 (“Each competition, each medal, and each 
world record struck a blow for the diplomatic recognition of East Germany.”). 
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the Soviet social and political system.”35 The Soviet Union reportedly 
invested government funds in sports that would yield the greatest 
amount of international prestige.36 Today, China is a leading 
example of Communist sportive nationalism, as its use of sports has 
evolved from promoting friendship to seeking Olympic victories.37 
By hosting the Beijing Olympics and spending close to $60 billion 
on preparations, the Chinese government hoped to displace reports 
of human rights abuses by showing images of a modern country and 
economy to an international television audience of over four billion 
people.38 
Sportive nationalism also has played a significant, if less obvious, 
role in United States foreign policy.39 In contrast to the former 
Communist Bloc, the United States Government was slower to view 
Olympic Movement sport as an international relations tool.40 In the 
1970s, commentators argued that the United States Government 
should take a greater role in Olympic Movement sport.41 At the 
time, sport in the United States was treated as a private activity 
without foreign policy implications.42 Although isolated examples, 
such as the United States’ “ping-pong diplomacy” with China,43 
 
 35. Beck, supra note 16, at 84 (quoting Background Briefing: Sport in the Soviet Union 
(London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1980), p. 1); see also VINOKUR, supra note 15, 
at 98, 109 (“[T]he leaders of the Soviet Union have always considered sport to be a key aspect 
of international politics . . . . [A] frequent Soviet media tactic . . . is to proclaim that Soviet 
sports victories are another verification of the superiority of the Soviet system.”). 
 36. See VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 15. 
 37. Id. at 104. 
 38. See generally Tim Ferguson, Running in Place, FORBES, Nov. 12, 2007; S.L. Price, 
Olympic China, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 13, 2007, at 72.  
 39. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 259 (“United States sports officials, journalists, 
politicians, and the public often ignore the relationship between sports and international 
politics.”). 
 40. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 838–54. 
 41. See id. at 854 (“[T]he United States Government clearly should develop a 
comprehensive and coherent foreign sports policy . . . .”). 
 42. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORT, THE FINAL REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORTS 1875–1977, at 12, 18 (1977); Nafziger, 
supra note 16, at 839. 
 43. Ping-pong diplomacy refers to the competition between American and Chinese 
ping-pong players in the 1970s. Many credit the competition with thawing relations between 
the two countries, which had not had diplomatic relations with one another since 1949. See, 
e.g., Theodore Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. 
REV. 227, 306 (1991); James Nafziger & Li Wei, China’s Sports Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 
453, 457–58 (1998).  
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showed that the United States did not ignore the potential benefits 
of sport in international relations, it was the overwhelming success of 
the Soviet Bloc44 in international competition during the height of 
the Cold War that put pressure on the United States and other 
Western superpowers to match their sporting success.45 In addition 
to passing the Amateur Sports Act,46 discussed in more detail in part 
II below, the government has taken a lead role in the Olympic 
Movement, hosting47 several Olympic Games48 and boycotting 
another.49 And, of course, sportive nationalism is prevalent in 
government rhetoric. Regardless of their political affiliation, 
government officials believe, and expect, that American athletes will 
reflect what is best about the United States.50  
 
 44. The success was so great that many argued the Soviet Bloc athletes should not be 
allowed to compete in Olympic competition because the athletes were the equivalent of 
professionals. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORT, supra note 42, at 4 
(“[T]here is widespread perception among Americans that it is unfair for U.S. amateur athletes 
to compete against state-subsidized professionals from other countries.”); ESPY, supra note 15, 
at 26–27 (explaining the international community’s concern after World War II that the Soviet 
Union would be allowed to participate in the Olympic movement because its athletes were 
viewed as professionals and not amateurs in the Olympic spirit: “‘[S]port like everything else in 
Russia is organized by the State. There are no clubs like in our countries. It is a committee 
appointed by the State that runs everything with government money. . . . All athletes that 
compete in foreign countries are specifically trained at the expense of the State and they are 
taught to compete in a fighting spirit. . . . Amateurism is not at all understood.’” (quoting 
then-IOC President Sigfrid Edstrom in a letter to then-IOC Vice President Avery Brundage)). 
 45. See Beck, supra note 16, at 84–88.  
 46. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2000).  
 47. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 69 (“While success in competition remains important, it 
is hosting the event itself that is increasingly significant and valuable . . . .”). 
 48. In a 1999 report to Congress, the General Accounting Office stated that the United 
States Government had spent at least $2.1 billion (in 1999 dollars) to stage the Los Angeles 
(1984), Atlanta (1996) and Salt Lake City (2002) Olympic Games. UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, OLYMPIC GAMES: PRELIMINARY 
INFORMATION ON FEDERAL FUNDING AND SUPPORT: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS 2–3 (1999). 
 49. The United States boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.  
 50. For instance, in 1992, President George H.W. Bush stated in addressing the 
American Olympians of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games:  
[I]n the broad and in the truest sense, all of you here today mirror America’s 
Olympic spirit: the work ethic, the desire to give of yourself and of your heart, the 
love of victory and, above all, competition. Each quality makes the Olympics great. 
Each, in turn, makes our country great . . . . [You are] Americans who showed what 
we mean by competition, decency, self-reliance, self-discipline, proving that the 
Olympics, like America, are truly number one. 
President George H.W. Bush, Remarks Congratulating United States Olympic Athletes (April 
8, 1992), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGE H.W. BUSH, 
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It is now clear that sport today has become an important tool to 
promote nationalism,51 as the government over the last three decades 
has relied more heavily than ever before on the United States 
Olympic Movement as a way to enhance the nation’s prestige.52 Yet 
despite the importance of sport in promoting United States prestige, 
sports officials, the media, and the American public either discount 
or ignore altogether the relationship between sports and 
international relations.53 Indeed, in the United States, the 
government and politicians often attempt to minimize the role of 
elite sport in international affairs.54 The discussion that follows aims 
to bring sportive nationalism to light and highlight the ways it can 
cross over from benign pageantry and rhetoric to threatening 
athletes’ constitutional rights. 
II. EARLY SPORTIVE NATIONALISM: THE AMATEUR SPORTS ACT 
AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE AMERICAN OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
To understand how sportive nationalism can threaten athletes’ 
constitutional rights through anti-doping enforcement, it is 
important to examine how early sportive nationalism, manifested in 
the structure of the United States Olympic Movement, set the stage. 
When, in the early 1970s, the United States decided to challenge its 
Cold War enemies’ success in Olympic Movement sport, the 
 
1992, at 560 (1998). Similarly, as stated by President Bill Clinton in an address to Olympic 
athletes competing in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games: 
So tonight when you walk into that opening ceremony . . . you carry the symbol of 
all that we have become not only in fact, but in the eyes and the spirit and the hopes 
of the rest of the world. And just as surely as those of us who work in the diplomatic 
area or the fine people who wear the uniform of the United States military, you will 
become a symbol . . . . [Y]ou are a source of enormous pride to our country and an 
inspiration to the world. 
President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the United States Olympic Team in Atlanta, Georgia 
(July 19, 1996), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. 
CLINTON, 1996, at 1158 (1998). 
 51. VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 108; ESPY, supra note 15, at 4.  
 52. Such a development is consistent with the United States’ growing awareness of sport 
as an international relations tool. See VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 18 (“As the awareness by 
governments of the significance of sports in domestic and international politics grows, they will 
tend to increase control of sports to advance their own political goals.”). 
 53. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 259; see also VINOKUR, supra note 15, at xii 
(“[Sport’s] relationship to politics has been little explored.”). 
 54. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 259 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON 
OLYMPIC SPORTS, supra note 42, at 1). 
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government undertook to explore ways to harness and enhance our 
athletic talents in support of the national interest. The result of those 
early efforts was the Amateur Sports Act,55 which affected athletes’ 
rights most significantly by subverting them to the national 
interest.56  
Olympic Movement sport in the United States prior to the 
Amateur Sports Act (the Act) was the product of the free market. 
Sport governing bodies such as the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, the Amateur Athletic Union, and others asserted their 
jurisdiction over athletes and competitions.57 Disputes among 
amateur sports regulators led to difficulties in determining which 
organization would send teams to international competitions.58 
Conducted without a centralizing authority whose goal it was to 
prepare athletes for international competition, the United States’ 
success in Olympic Movement competition was not as great as many 
hoped and believed it could be. As stated by the House Judiciary 
Committee, “[t]he overall decline of American achievement in 
Olympic and international competition was apparent. For a nation of 
 
 55. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2000). 
 56. Previous legal examinations of the practice of sportive nationalism by the United 
States highlighted the fact that that there are no domestic law restraints on the federal 
government using sport to further foreign policy goals. Paul Mastrocola, The Lord of the Rings: 
The Role of Olympic Site Selection as a Weapon Against Human Rights Abuses: China’s Bid for 
the 2000 Olympics, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 141, 166; Nafziger, supra note 16, at 845. 
(“As a matter of domestic law, the executive branch of the federal government may, under the 
foreign relations power or under delegated congressional authority, employ amateur athletics 
as another tool of foreign policy.”) (citations omitted). Scholars have explained that while the 
Amateur Sports Act designates the USOC as having the exclusive authority over Olympic 
Movement sport in the United States, this legislation cannot limit the federal government in 
exercising other powers, such as the foreign relations power, granted under the Constitution. 
Mastrocola, supra, at 150. The ability of the federal Government to use sport as part of its 
foreign policy arsenal, however, is only one side of the coin. The authority of the foreign policy 
power presumably only supports action that applies to the use of sport in general to achieve 
foreign policy goals, such as through an Olympic boycott. Sportive nationalism as traditionally 
practiced in the United States has been practiced at this more general level and has therefore 
been benign with respect to individual rights. This Article addresses the instances when 
sportive nationalism results in punishing individual athletes. 
 57. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORTS, supra note 42, at 37–38. 
 58. Id. at 3 (explaining that jurisdictional disputes between amateur sports regulators 
acted to “stymie” athletes’ careers). The Commission cited the example of high school and 
college students who “have lost their eligibility to compete in school sports because they have 
represented the nation in international competition . . . . Athletes have been prevented by the 
[National Governing Body] from competing in their sport simply because it was sponsored by 
a rival organization.” Id. 
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almost 250 million people, we were falling seriously below our 
potential to . . . field strong international teams . . . .”59 This failure 
on the world stage prompted President Ford to appoint a 
Commission on Olympic Sports to study the issue.60 The 
Commission noted at the outset that “in international sport . . . 
American performances are deteriorating. Against athletes from 
nations for whom Olympic medals are as precious as moon rocks, 
U.S competitors seem to have steadily diminishing chances of 
success.”61 
The Commission was charged with determining what factors 
prevented the United States from achieving greater international 
sporting success,62 and its report strongly reflected the Cold War 
culture at that time. The report declared at the outset that “a 
nation’s success in international sports competition is not indicative 
of the merits of its ideology—despite some countries’ attempts to 
convince us otherwise.”63 Nevertheless, the Commission still asserted 
that “America’s strengths are clearly reflected in her sport.”64 The 
converse, according to the Commission, was not true however, as 
the Commission stated that “the weaknesses of American sport are 
not indications of concomitant weaknesses in the nation.”65 Yet 
despite the declaration that sport does not reflect the merits of a 
nation’s ideology, the Commission set about to recommend a 
decidedly American style for Olympic Movement sport regulation 
that focused on fostering “individual athletic achievement”66 
through the free market and not federal regulation.67 The 
Commission explained that “the United States must rely on its 
greatest strength, free enterprise, to help finance amateur sport.”68 
The Commission’s primary recommendation was to create a 
centralized sports organization that had the exclusive right to select 
 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1627, 8–9 (1978). 
 60. Exec. Order No. 11,868, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1975). 
 61. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON OLYMPIC SPORTS, supra note 42, at 1. 
 62. Id. at ix. 
 63. Id. at 1. 
 64. Id. at 11. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1. 
 67. Id. at 29. 
 68. Id. at 79. 
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athletes for Olympic Movement competition.69 The Commission 
rejected a role for the federal government, preferring instead to rely 
on privately incorporated National Governing Bodies (NGBs)70 to 
develop athletes.71 The Amateur Sports Act accordingly made the 
USOC a federally chartered, non-profit patriotic corporation72 and 
gave the USOC exclusive power to coordinate and govern Olympic 
Movement athletics in the United States.73 
As an early manifestation of sportive nationalism, the Act left a 
long-standing effect: it structured the United States Olympic 
Movement in a way that promoted the national interest over the 
rights of athletes. Such an effect is not surprising given that the Act 
grew out of the government’s desire for the United States to 
perform better in Olympic Movement competition. Moreover, such 
an effect was not necessarily troubling in the 1970s, when the Act 
was passed, because sportive nationalism at that time was expressed 
through the collective sporting success of the nation, so that the 
incentive created by sportive nationalism was to promote athlete 
eligibility and maximize athletes’ opportunities to compete. In 
addition, it arguably was appropriate to place national interests over 
athletes’ rights because Cold War-era athletes had little claim to a 
constitutionally protected property right or liberty interest in their 
eligibility. 
Several features of the Act evidence a clear intent to promote the 
national interest over the rights of athletes. To begin, the Act 
highlights that the USOC’s focus was to be successful in 
international competition.74 Thus, the Act states that the purposes of 
the USOC are, among other things: 
 
 69. Id. at 2. 
 70. Id. A national governing body is a non-profit amateur sports organization which 
acts as this country’s representative in the corresponding international sports federation for that 
particular sport. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6761, 7482 n.1. The NGB sets goals and eligibility 
criteria for the sport it governs. Id. 
 71. The Commission also recommended that more be done to increase private sector 
funding for sports, increase participation by women and disabled individuals in sports, and 
enhance the pipeline for developing world-class athletes. Additionally, the Commission made 
specific recommendations, ultimately incorporated in the Amateur Sports Act, for settling 
disputes between athletes and NGBs and entities vying to be NGBs. 
 72. 36 U.S.C. § 220507 (2000). 
 73. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3); see also S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 554 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 74. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(2) (2000). 
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[T]o coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United 
States, directly related to international amateur athletic  
competition . . . 
[T]o exercise exclusive jurisdiction . . . over all matters pertaining 
to United States participation in the Olympic Games, Paralympic 
Games and the Pan-American Games . . . and [over] the 
organization of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, and 
the Pan-American Games when held in the United States; 
[T]o obtain for the United States, directly or by delegation to the 
appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur 
representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games . . . 
[T]o promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the 
United States and foreign nations.75 
Other purposes include establishing national goals for amateur 
athletics and supporting amateur athletics through development of 
facilities and coordination of information on coaching, performance, 
and training,76 all of which serve the national athletic interest by 
helping develop successful athletes. To support these activities, the 
Act gave the USOC the exclusive right to use the Olympic 
trademarks—a right that provides an enormous economic benefit.77 
Significantly, the USOC was also given the power to recognize 
NGBs for each sport represented in the Olympic Movement.78 The 
NGBs, in turn, establish specific eligibility criteria for athletes in their 
respective sports. This provision was significant because it gave the 
USOC the exclusive power to recognize one NGB for each sport, 
which would put an end to the disputes between groups such as the 
Amateur Athletic Union, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, and the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for 
Women—disputes that jeopardized talented athletes’ ability to 
participate in international competition.79 The Commission and 
 
 75. 36 U.S.C. § 220503. 
 76. Id. 
 77. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 522. 
 78. 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(4). 
 79. S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 2 (1978) (“Because no real structure exists which serves to 
define the jurisdictional limits of the various organizations, disputes have arisen. In their 
struggles for power and control over a sport, organizations have frequently told their athletes 
that if they choose to compete in a rival organization’s program, they will be declared ineligible 
for future competition. Thus, athletes, upon whom the existence of each organization 
depends, have often found themselves the victims of that same organization and the amateur 
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Congress believed that these disputes were responsible for the 
nation’s poor showing in international competition.80 To further 
ensure that our most talented athletes were not prevented from 
competing because of NGB bureaucracy, the Act mandated that the 
USOC 
establish and maintain provisions . . . for the swift and equitable 
resolution of disputes involving any of its members [NGBs] and 
relating to the opportunity of an amateur athlete . . . to participate 
in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, the Pan American 
Games, world championship competition, or other protected 
competition. . . .81 
One such provision requires NGBs to “agree to submit to binding 
arbitration in any controversy” relating to an athlete’s opportunity to 
compete in Olympic Movement competition.82 
To be sure, the arbitration provision evidences some concern for 
athletes’ rights and provides athletes with far more protection than 
they had previously enjoyed in terms of protecting their opportunity 
to compete.83 However, it is of limited effect. First, the provision, 
when read in context with the purposes behind the Act, reflects the 
Government’s desire not to protect athletes’ sporting careers, but to 
 
athletic system.”); Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The 
principal purpose of the Act was to provide a means of settling disputes between organizations 
seeking to be recognized as the NGB for a particular sport and to shield amateur athletes from 
being harmed by these struggles.”). 
 80. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–1627, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6761, 
7482 (discussing the “disorganization and serious factional disputes” that contributed to the 
“decline of American achievement in Olympic and international competition”). 
 81. 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a) (2000). The USOC responded to this provision of the Act 
by stating that “no member of the [USOC] may deny or threaten to deny any amateur athlete 
the opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games, . . . a World Championship competition, 
or other such protected competition . . . . The [USOC] shall, by all reasonable means at its 
disposal, protect the right of an amateur athlete to participate if selected (or to attempt to 
qualify for selection to participate) as an athlete representing the United States in any of the 
aforesaid competitions.”). 
 82. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(4). These procedures were essential in a case involving a 
wrestler who was wrongly denied the opportunity to compete on the 2000 Olympic team by 
USA Wrestling. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000). The 
wrestler took his case to arbitration and won an award that was confirmed in federal court. Id. 
at 1008. 
 83. S. REP. NO. 95-770, at 6 (1978) (explaining that this provision “is a positive step 
forward. . . . [A]thletes will no longer be used as pawns by one organization to gain advantage 
over another. . . . [A]thletes should, in the future, realize more opportunities to compete than 
ever before.”). 
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protect the United States’ ability to field the best possible athletes 
for international competition.84 Thus, the arbitration provisions are 
meant to be used by athletes against NGBs, which might be unfairly 
preventing them from competing in Olympic Movement 
competition.85 Courts have found that the procedures confer no 
right to compete,86 and more recently, at least one court has found 
that the Commercial Arbitration procedures provided for are 
inapplicable in cases where an athlete faces losing her eligibility 
because of a doping allegation.87 Finally, given their limited scope, 
the procedures are arguably outdated and unnecessary. With the 
vertical sport structure established by the Act, and the USOC’s 
exclusive authority to coordinate amateur athletics and name NGBs, 
the factional disputes (and resulting disqualification of athletes from 
international competition) that were meant to be prevented by the 
procedures have now disappeared. 
Aside from the text of the Act itself, courts have interpreted its 
provisions as preferencing the national interest over athletes’ rights. 
This was apparent in DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Commission,88 
essentially the only case to challenge sportive nationalism’s effects on 
athletes. In that case, a group of athletes brought claims under the 
Act and the United States Constitution challenging the 
government’s decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic 
Games.89 In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
The United States responded by invoking a variety of sanctions, 
including planning a boycott of the Olympic Games.90 The USOC 
initially resisted the President’s request to boycott, arguing that the 
best way to counter the Soviet’s display of aggression in Afghanistan 
was to beat them in their Olympic Games.91 However, President 
 
 84. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7482. 
 85. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1000. 
 86. DeFrantz. v. U. S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 87. Jacobs v. U.S. Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
 88. 492 F. Supp. 1181. 
 89. Id. at 1182. 
 90. Id. at 1183 (explaining that the Carter Administration was concerned that “the 
presence of American competitors would be taken by the Soviets as evidence that their invasion 
had faded from memory or was not a matter of great consequence or concern to this nation” 
and that “the Soviet Union has made clear that it intends the Games to serve important 
national political ends. For the U.S.S.R., international sports competition is an instrument of 
government policy and a means to advance foreign policy goals.”). 
 91. VINOKUR, supra note 15, at 117. 
KOLLER.FIN 11/25/2008 11:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1482 
Carter announced in his State of the Union address that he would 
not support sending a United States team to compete in the 
Olympic Games as long as the Soviet military forces remained in 
Afghanistan.92 Moreover, the House of Representatives and Senate 
passed resolutions opposing participation in the Olympic Games by 
United States athletes. White House counsel met with the USOC 
Executive Board and other USOC officers and urged them to vote 
against sending a team to Moscow. The USOC was allegedly 
informed that if it did not agree to boycott the Games, the 
government would terminate its federal funding and possibly revoke 
its tax exempt status.93 If it did comply, however, the USOC would 
be provided with increased federal funding.94 President Carter also 
met with the Athlete’s Advisory Council, an official body of the 
USOC, and told them that the United States would not send a team 
to the Moscow games.95 Finally, President Carter sent a message to 
the USOC and stated that he would take all legal action necessary to 
enforce his decision not to send a team to the Moscow Games.96  
The athletes claimed that in complying with the government’s 
request to boycott the Games, the USOC was violating the Act.97 
The athletes argued that the Act did not authorize the USOC to 
decide not to enter a team in an Olympic Games and that the Act 
guaranteed athletes a right to compete in the Olympic Games.98 The 
court disagreed, holding that the Act implicitly allowed the USOC 
the discretion to determine whether it would enter a team in the 
Olympic Games because Congress had not explicitly limited the 
USOC’s powers to do so through the Act.99 Moreover, the court 
explained that the USOC’s discretion to decline participation in an 
Olympic Games is not limited to simply “sports-related reasons” but 
could be for reasons completely unrelated to sports.100 The court also 
 
 92. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1184. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. Commentators explained that the boycott acted to “serv[e] notice to the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European countries that it also can use sport for political goals.” VINOKUR, 
supra note 15, at 120. 
 96. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1184. 
 97. Id. at 1185. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1188. 
 100. Id. 
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rejected the athletes’ claim that the Act conferred a “right to 
compete,” explaining that the language of the Act101 was limited to 
“the context of the numerous jurisdictional disputes between athletic 
bodies, such as the NCAA and AAU.” These organizations 
previously had in some cases deprived elite athletes of the ability to 
enter international competitions.102 Thus, the “right to compete” 
was only to prevent athletic organizations from depriving an athlete 
of the opportunity to enter competitions “for petty and groundless 
reasons”; it was “not designed to provide any substantive 
guarantees” and did not extend so far as to confer a right to compete 
where the USOC refused to enter a team in the Olympic Games.103 
The court also concluded that, in any event, the Act did not create a 
private right of action.104 
Despite the text and interpretations of the Act which effectively 
subvert athletes’ rights to the national interest, it can be said that the 
Act has protected athletes’ rights by codifying the private sector 
structure of the USOC. The Act reaffirmed the private nature of 
Olympic Movement sport by not giving the government a role in 
selecting or training athletes for international competition.105 By 
statutorily keeping the Government out of this process, it could be 
argued that Congress at least formally insulated athletes to a great 
extent from the potential dangers of sportive nationalism.106 
However, as DeFrantz illustrates, the “private” status of the USOC 
 
 101. The relevant provisions cited by the athletes stated that the USOC shall “provide for 
the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes . . . and protect the 
opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . to participate in amateur athletic competition.” Id. at 
1189–90 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 374(8)). 
 102. Defrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1190. 
 103. Id. at 1190–91. 
 104. Id. at 1191. 
 105. The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 gives the USOC “exclusive jurisdiction” and 
authority over the participation and representation of athletes in the Olympic Games. The 
USOC delegates the exclusive power to determine individual eligibility and participation to the 
recognized NGB for each sport. This is from the Amateur Sports Act and is further supported 
in the USOC bylaws. 
 106. This danger is illustrated by Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Association, 227 F.3d 1000 
(2000). The question in Lindland was who should be the United States entrant to the 2000 
Olympic Games in Greco-Roman wrestling. Id. at 1002. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit ultimately heard the case after the USOC failed to follow an arbitrator’s 
decision awarding the spot to Matt Lindland. Id. at 1001–02. The USOC favored a competing 
wrestler, Keith Sieracki. Senator Stevens sent a letter to the district court urging it to support 
the USOC’s choice. Id. at 1008. The Seventh Circuit upheld the selection procedures outlined 
in the Act, and Lindland was awarded the spot. Id. 
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does little to insulate athletes from sportive nationalism where the 
national interest is implicated. In this regard, the Act’s provisions 
with respect to athletes’ rights are largely illusory.107 Congress has 
refused to grant athletes a cause of action under the Act, and, when 
originally considered, Congress rejected a provision for an “Amateur 
Athlete’s Bill of Rights.”108 Moreover, courts following DeFrantz 
have held that the Act does not give athletes any private right of 
action to challenge eligibility decisions.109 Courts have only 
recognized a cause of action for athletes in narrow circumstances to 
ensure that sports governing bodies follow their own rules.110 In 
addition, in 1998, Congress amended the Act to deny a court 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction allowing an athlete to compete 
within twenty-one days of the Olympic Games.111 Thus, athletes’ 
rights take a back seat to the national interest through the provisions 
of the Amateur Sports Act.112 
 
 107. The interpretation of the Act in some respects might be seen as fundamentally unfair 
in that its provisions as written and applied seem to guarantee athlete eligibility from the 
perspective of the United States obtaining the best possible representation for international 
competition, but not to protect eligibility when it is the athlete that is aggrieved. So, for 
instance, the Act protects the right of high school students to compete in the Olympic Games 
even if such participation would conflict with state “outside competition” rules. See Letendre v. 
Mo. St. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 86 S.W. 3d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).  
 108. Michels v. USOC, 741 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Congress omitted the bill 
of rights provision in the Act’s final version. Congress thus considered and rejected a cause of 
action for athletes to enforce the Act’s provisions.”). 
 109. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1181 (holding there is no right held by amateur athletes 
to compete in the Olympic Games); see also Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 
580, 588 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the plaintiff was not claiming a private right of action 
and sought to distance herself from such claims because they are not successful); see also 
Walton-Floyd v. USOC, 965 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Martinez v. USOC, 802 
F.2d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1986); Oldfield v. Athletic Cong., 779 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 
1985); Michels, 741 F.2d at 155, 157–58. 
 110. Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1007; Foschi v. U.S. Swimming, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 232, 239 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (D. Or. 
1994), vacated on other grounds, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995). 
 111. 36 U.S.C. § 220509. The Act was also amended to provide for an “ombudsman” 
for athletes to provide advice about the provisions of the Act and the applicable constitution 
and bylaws of the USOC and relevant NGBs and international federations relating to the 
athletes’ opportunity to participate in Olympic Movement competition. 36 U.S.C. § 
220509(b). 
 112. Indeed, there is a general hostility toward athletes using the courts to provide them 
with any relief in cases where their individual rights may be threatened. The case of figure 
skater Tonya Harding is illustrative. In 1994, Tonya Harding was implicated in an attack on 
rival skater Nancy Kerrigan at the United States Figure Skating Championships. ADAM 
EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 211–12 (2002). Not knowing immediately that Harding was involved 
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Finally, although it is not immediately apparent, the Act’s 
conception of sport as a private endeavor, meant to distinguish the 
United States from its Cold War enemies, also tends to minimize 
athletes’ rights in the face of the national interest. Drawing on the 
Act, the Supreme Court has solidified this view, as it held in San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee 
that the USOC’s role is a private sector one and not a public 
function.113 Although the Court did not deal with an athlete 
dispute,114 the Court’s opinion in San Francisco Arts was telling. The 
majority saw the regulation of amateur athletics as fundamentally 
private and not a government concern.115 The labeling of sport as 
“private” by courts reflects the image of American sport constructed 
and perpetuated by the Act as an individual, private-sector pursuit 
free of government involvement. Yet this view must be put in its 
Cold War context and should not preclude the possibility of 
considering changes to the operation and importance of Olympic 
 
in the attack, the United States Figure Skating Association certified Harding for a place on the 
1994 Olympic Team. Id. Subsequently, the United States Figure Skating Association initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against her for her role in the attack. Id. The United States Figure 
Skating Association’s bylaws provided that a hearing would be set for a time that was 
“reasonably convenient for all parties.” Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 
1476, 1478 (D. Or. 1994). In an effort to prevent Harding from competing in the upcoming 
World Championships, United States Figure Skating unilaterally set a hearing date that made it 
virtually impossible for Harding to provide a defense. Id. at 1479. Moreover, the timing of the 
hearing would have “severely prejudiced her chances for a fair trial” in the upcoming criminal 
proceedings she faced. Id. Recognizing that United States Figure Skating was not following its 
own bylaws, and that such failure would cause irreparable harm to Harding, the United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon granted Harding an injunction to stop the planned 
hearing. Id. In a later congressional hearing on the Amateur Sports Act and the provisions 
related to athlete eligibility disputes, a representative from United States Figure Skating 
explained that to avoid judicial intrusion in such matters in the future it had, with the tacit 
approval of Congress, amended its bylaws to provide the United States Figure Skating 
Association with complete authority to hold expedited hearings “to allow competitions to go 
forward unencumbered by legal process.” Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Sen. Comm. of Commerce, Sci., and 
Transp., 104th Cong. 177 (1995) (statement of William Hybl, Chairman, U.S. Figure Skating 
Ass’n). 
 113. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 114. The facts of San Francisco Arts pertain to the use of the word “Olympic” by a non-
USOC entity. The non-profit sponsor of an event it called the “Gay Olympic Games” found 
itself embroiled in a lawsuit with the USOC, which denied the “Gay Olympic Games” sponsor 
the use of the Olympic trademark. Id. at 527–28.  
 115. Id. at 543–45 (“[N]either the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has 
been a traditional government function . . . [and] the fact that Congress granted it a corporate 
charter does not render the USOC a [g]overnment agent.”). 
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Movement sport, both with respect to athletes and the national 
interest. The dissent in San Francisco Arts recognized this, as its 
opinion conceived of the Olympic Movement’s very real foreign 
relations functions.116 
It might be that for Olympic Movement competition, it is 
necessary to subvert athletes’ rights to the national interest to 
promote efficiency and allow the USOC the greatest flexibility in 
fielding high-quality, internationally competitive teams. In most 
cases, this is not of concern, as athletes do not and should not have a 
categorical right to compete. In addition, in most cases, the national 
interest and athletes’ interests align, as the interest in success in 
Olympic Movement competition is consistent with allowing the 
most qualified athletes to compete. From this perspective, the trade-
off of athletes’ rights in favor of the national interest might be 
justified. What is of concern, however, is how the structure of the 
United States Olympic Movement established by the Act might 
unjustly empower the USOC (and now the USADA), working in 
concert with the government, in cases where an athlete’s eligibility is 
being terminated. As we are now in an era where athletes can make a 
credible claim to constitutional rights in their sporting careers, 
expressions of the national interest which strip them of their 
eligibility to compete pose a troubling conflict. In these 
circumstances the Act, as written and interpreted, does not do 
enough to address athletes’ rights. 
III. SPORTIVE NATIONALISM FOR A NEW ERA:  
DEMONSTRATING MORALITY THROUGH THE PUNISHMENT OF 
INDIVIDUAL ATHLETES 
With the backdrop of the privatized Olympic Movement and the 
way in which it subverts athletes’ rights to the national interest, it is 
now possible to examine United States sportive nationalism in its 
current form. Such an examination shows that sportive nationalism 
in the United States has evolved from using sport to gain national 
prestige in a way that aligns with athletes’ interests to taking punitive 
 
 116. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The USOC performs a distinctive, traditional 
governmental function: it represents this Nation to the world community. . . . As the Olympic 
Games have grown in international visibility and importance, the USOC’s role as our national 
representative has taken on increasing significance. Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly 
non-political, Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist.”). 
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action against individual athletes for that very same purpose. With 
the Cold War long over, the sportive nationalistic emphasis no 
longer promotes private enterprise and individual achievement. 
Instead, the government now uses sport to demonstrate national 
morality by punishing athletes who “cheat” in sport by using 
performance-enhancing drugs.117  
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that this Article 
does not challenge the fight against doping in sport as a legitimate 
public policy issue. Indeed, the fight against doping is a perfectly 
legitimate domestic and international public policy issue, as an 
international consensus has now developed against doping in 
sport.118 It therefore seems clear that, for the near term at least, it is 
in the United States’ interest to be a significant part of worldwide 
anti-doping efforts. Further, these efforts to control doping in sport 
are premised on seemingly solid moral foundations. Government 
officials and regulators stress that the purpose is to protect individual 
athletes from the harmful effects of using performance-enhancing 
agents.119 Moreover, it is often explained that controlling doping is 
important because it eliminates the pressure on “clean” athletes to 
use harmful performance enhancers in an effort to effectively 
compete with those who do, and it maintains the integrity of 
 
 117. Such demonstrations are needed now more than ever. Surveys from The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project (part of the Pew Research Center which has conducted surveys in fifty-four 
countries to gauge attitudes about globalization, trade, and democracy) show that the rest of 
the world has serious questions about the morality of the United States. The international 
public opinion of the United States has reached all-time lows. Pew Global Attitude Project, 
U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php? 
ReportID=247 (2005). Recent surveys show increasing levels of dislike toward American 
values and a rejection of American ideas and customs. In countries such as Turkey, a long time 
American ally in the Muslim world, only 9% of the population has a favorable view of the 
United States. This is down from 52% in 2000. Another example is Indonesia, where favorable 
views have declined to 29% from 75% in 2000. Bay Fang, U.S. Out to Buff Its Global Image, 
CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2007, at A1. 
 118. An indication of this consensus is the number of countries which have adopted the 
WADA Code. As of this writing, 205 National Olympic Committees and 72 anti-doping 
agencies had adopted the Code. See http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2008); 
see also Testimony of Frank Shorter, Before the House Commerce, Trade and Consumer 
Protection Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, May 18, 2005 on 
the Drug Free Sports Act of 2005 (“[A]ll Olympic sports organizations throughout the world 
and most governments, including the United States, have agreed to these principles and 
endorse this model as the most effective framework for the fight against doping in sports.”). 
 119. Maria Tai Wolff, Playing by the Rules? A Legal Analysis of the United States Olympic 
Committee-Soviet Olympic Committee Doping Control Agreement, 25 STAN. J. INT’L L. 611, 
626 (1988–89). 
KOLLER.FIN 11/25/2008 11:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1488 
sport.120 Such an approach values individuals and their well-being, 
and for that reason doping control programs enjoy the appearance of 
a strong ethical anchor.  
However, the other side of anti-doping initiatives, and the side 
focused on by this Article, is one with a more consequentialist 
justification. The procedures used to enforce anti-doping rules 
appear less concerned with the individuals accused and more 
concerned with outcomes.121 Such an approach is fundamentally 
unfair because the government can be viewed as reaping the benefits 
of sportive nationalism while imposing the burdens on individual 
athletes. Thus, while the goal of fighting doping in sport is 
legitimate, it is how that goal is achieved given the unique structure 
of the privatized Olympic Movement and the strong incentive for 
the government to be involved because of sportive nationalism that 
is analyzed here. Accordingly, this section highlights several potential 
issues related to individual rights that indicate sportive nationalism, 
at least in this context, has crossed the line from neutral or benign to 
threatening athletes’ rights. 
A. Athlete Doping—A Foreign Relations Problem 
The government’s fight against athlete doping has taken on the 
rhetoric of a moral crusade. Anti-doping initiatives are to fight 
“cheaters” and protect the integrity of competition. Moreover, 
government officials seek to “protect the rights” of innocent athletes 
and fans who participate in the Olympic spectacle. Yet, the anti-
 
 120. Id. 
 121. This is demonstrated by the fact that doping violations are considered strict liability 
offenses by the WADA Code. “It is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing use 
on the athlete’s part be demonstrated.” Article 2.1.1. 121. Michael Hiltzik. Presumed Guilty: 
Athletes See Doping Case Appeals as Futile Exercise, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006 (citing the 
example of sprinter Torri Edwards who was suspended for two years despite the arbitrators in 
her case acknowledging “[s]he ha[d] not sought to gain any improper advantage or to ‘cheat’ 
in any way”). Giorgia Squizzato was banned for a year after her use of an over-the-counter foot 
ointment resulted in a positive test for steroids. Arbitrators acknowledged that “the cream did 
not enhance the athlete’s capacity” nor “favor her performance.” Id. American cyclist Amber 
Neben was suspended for six months after testing positive for steroids. The arbitration panel 
voted two to one to suspend her with the dissenting voter stating the fight against doping 
should not harm “innocent victims of a poorly regulated supplement industry.” Id. Zach 
Lund, an American skeleton competitor was suspended for one year and forced to miss the 
2006 Olympics when the anti-baldness medication he had been using for five years caused a 
positive steroid test. The arbitration panel in his case called Lund an “honest athlete” and 
noted that the substance had no performance enhancing effect. Id. 
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doping movement in the United States is less about the morality of 
doping and much more about the international relations 
consequences now attached to athlete doping and, conversely, the 
international currency to be gained by being tough on those who 
allegedly cheat. 
The traditional thinking has been that sportive nationalism 
undermines efforts to fight doping in Olympic Movement sport 
because it creates incentives for governments to tolerate doping to 
achieve athletic success.122 Critics have even suggested that sportive 
nationalism “can only encourage” a nation’s tacit acceptance of 
doping.123 This was certainly the case with the United States, which 
largely ignored the issue of doping in sports for decades.124 Prior to 
the formation of the USADA, the USOC administered drug testing 
through each sport’s NGB, which prosecuted athletes for doping 
violations under the NGBs’ own administrative procedures.125 As a 
result, the entities that were charged with selecting the finest athletes 
for Olympic and international competition, the USOC and NGBs, 
also administered drug testing and handed down the sanctions.126 
Critics thus argued that the USOC and NGBs had an inherent 
conflict of interest that prevented them from administering drug 
tests and punishing dopers effectively.127 There was ample evidence 
that Congress knew that doping was a problem, but it did nothing 
to stop it because the United States had become so successful in 
Olympic competition.128 For instance, strong evidence suggested 
 
 122. See Hoberman, WORKSHOP, supra note 14. 
 123. Hoberman, Doping, supra note 14, at 262.  
 124. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 64 (categorizing the United States as an “apathetic 
government” during the 1980s that recognized the problem but rarely did more than 
“ritual[ly] condemn” it). 
 125. Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes 
Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 124, 126 (2003). 
 126. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (2000). The USOC is directed “to obtain . . . the most 
competent amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games . . . .” 
 127. Tygart, supra note 125, at 126–27; see also National Strategy: Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. 23 (1999); Alan Abrahamson, 
Sprinter’s Ineligibility Won’t Cost U.S. Team; International Panel Rules the Other Gold 
Medalists in Sydney’s 1,600-Meter Relay Can Keep Their Medals, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2005. 
 128. Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign 
Commerce and Tourism of the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. 
154 (1995) (prepared statement of L. Richard Rader, Sport of Modern Pentathlon, Arlington 
Virginia) (explaining that in 1986, all members of the men’s modern pentathlon world 
championship team tested positive for banned substances, yet the USOC allowed them to 
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that numerous Olympic medalists were allowed to compete in 
Olympic competition after having failed drug tests.129 Over 100 
athletes who tested positive for banned substances between 1988 
and 2000 reportedly were cleared by internal USOC and NGB 
processes.130 Whatever the reality, it seems that the United States and 
other Olympic “superpowers” such as Canada and Australia were not 
inclined to take steps to fight doping in their own Olympic 
Movement sport systems because they needed to compete with the 
Communist states who they believed were routinely doping their 
athletes.131 At worst, the United States Government was thought to 
actually sanction cheating by its athletes to achieve success in 
international competition.132  
By the 1990s, there was a growing international perception that 
the United States was not doing enough to fight the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs by its Olympic athletes.133 The United 
States’ stance on doping was perceived to be weak,134 and this 
 
participate in competition). Rader noted that “Americans tested positive in the 1984 and 1988 
Olympics. The USOC took no action.” Id. He also explained that these incidents “gave 
credence to estimates of doping in pentathlon as high as seventy to eighty percent during the 
1970s and 1980s. Id. 
 129. Lewis and others were identified in documents released to Sports Illustrated by 
former USOC anti-doping chief Dr. Wade Exum in 2003. CBC Sports Online, 10 Drug 
Scandals, Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/drugs/stories/ 
top10.html; see also Tim Layden & Don Yaeger, Playing Favorites?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Apr. 21, 2003, at 21. 
 130. CBC Sports Online, 10 Drug Scandals, Jan. 19, 2003, available at http:// 
www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/drugs/stories/top10.html. 
 131. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 66. 
 132. Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United States 
Anti-Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 97–98 (2005). 
 133. Tygart, supra note 125, at 124; see also S. 529, to Authorize Appropriations for the 
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter S. 529] (statement of Jim Scherr, Chief 
Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic Committee). Jim Scherr stated that during a congressional 
hearing in 1999, prior to the formation of USADA, witnesses explained that the USOC was 
responsible for drug testing United States Olympic movement athletes, and that “[t]hey 
observed that this practice would appear to represent a conflict, because the USOC is charged 
with the responsibility of fielding a team whose objective is to win medals, and one might not 
have the greatest confidence that this same organization would penalize a potential medal 
winner for a drug infraction.” Id. 
 134. See Drug Free Sports Act of 2005: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sports Act] (statement of Frank Shorter, Former Chairman, United States Anti-
Doping Agency) (“In the 1990’s, the world did not view the United States as being 
committed to preventing doping amongst its Olympic athletes. The system of self-regulation 
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conflicted with the United States’ international image of being 
tough on illicit drug use.135 Indeed, prior to the formation of the 
USADA, there were charges that the USOC covered up the fact that 
drug use among elite athletes was “routine,” and that the United 
States Government’s response to the issue was “disingenuous.”136 
The United States was compared to the East Germans.137 In response 
to the United States’ perceived weakness in tackling the issue of 
doping, Richard Pound, the Chairman of WADA and Vice Chair of 
the IOC, even suggested that the United States be prevented from 
bidding to host the 2012 Olympic Games.138 In short, the 
international community viewed the United States as “the biggest 
cheaters in the world.”139 In the words of Senator John McCain, 
Olympic doping scandals “harm our image and will contribute to 
our image, whether deserved or undeserved, that the United States is 
a bully and unethical.”140 This kind of cheating is a classic 
manifestation of sportive nationalism. 
 Yet other manifestations can be more subtle. Because sportive 
nationalism “reflects the political trends and relationships in the 
world,”141 the United States shifted from ignoring athlete doping to 
actively working to combat it. Sports doping therefore transitioned 
from being a “private [sector] matter” to a significant “public policy 
 
by the various sports led to perceptions of conflict and allegations of attempts to hide doping 
behavior amongst United States athletes.”). 
 135. Steroid Use in Professional Baseball and Anti-Doping Issues in Amateur Sports: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the 
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. 34–35 (2002) (statement of 
Frank Shorter, Chairman, United States Anti-Doping Agency) (“It is important to the image 
of America . . . to not be perceived as a society that condones the use of steroids and steroid 
precursors.”). Mr. Shorter also noted that failing to adequately regulate steroids in the United 
States “undermines the image of the United States and our athletes as being committed to 
drug-free sport.” Id. at 35. 
 136. CL Cole, Drafting Kelli White, 28 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 219, 219–20 (2004); 
Sports Act, supra note 134, at 16.  
 137. S. 529, supra note 133 (statement of Terrence Madden, CEO, U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency) [hereinafter Terrence Madden] (“[S]ome people wanted to equate us with the East 
German System.”). 
 138. Cole, supra note 136, at 220. Indeed, doping scandals were widely viewed as 
damaging a nation’s bid to host an Olympic Games, as it did with China’s bid to host the 
2000 Olympic Games. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 69. 
 139. Terrence Madden, supra note 137, at 7. 
 140. Cole, supra note 136, at 221. 
 141. ESPY, supra note 15. 
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issue.”142 In discussing this shift, one commentator stated that the 
United States Government’s change on this issue was particularly 
noteworthy. He explained that “[p]erhaps the most perplexing 
recalculation of interests was within the United States Government, 
which had for many years studiously avoided acknowledging the 
issue of doping in sport only to emerge at the end of the 1990s as a 
leading supporter of WADA and a more rigorous anti-doping 
regime.”143 
Commentators have examined a variety of reasons why the 
United States became more interested in fighting doping in sport. 
One reason cited by observers is that the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War “diminished the value of international sport 
as a surrogate for super-power rivalry.”144 Moreover, according to 
neo-liberalism, certain benefits to joining in an international 
movement to fight doping in sport become clearer because there was 
likely at that time a “cost of non-compliance due to damage to 
reputation”145 that would run the risk of “‘forfeit[ing] potential 
future gains from cooperation.’”146 With dozens of countries signed 
on to the International Convention Against Doping, including 
China, Russia, Germany, and Canada, international pressure to be a 
part of the solution was strong.147 
It is apparent, then, that the United States’ change of heart on 
doping is not the result of the demise of American sportive 
nationalism, but in fact is a further manifestation of it. While the 
private sector was delivering athletes who were winning, they were 
no longer enhancing national prestige because of the cloud of 
doping.148 The United States Government therefore ostensibly 
 
 142. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 62.  
 143. Id. at 72. 
 144. Id. at 66. 
 145. Id. at 67. 
 146. Id. (quoting ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 36 (1997)).  
 147. UNESCO.org, http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language 
=E&order=alpha; see also Philip Hersh, Chicago Bid Gets Bush’s Push: President Urges Key 
Passage of Anti-Doping Accord, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2008, at 6 (reporting that the pressure to 
ratify the UNESCO anti-doping convention and participate in the worldwide fight against 
doping is so strong that the United States’ bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games will be in 
jeopardy if the convention is not ratified soon). 
 148. See Houlihan, supra note 21, at 69 (explaining that in the 1900s, states “realized 
that the strengthening association between elite sport and drugs was undermining the utility of 
sport” in international relations). 
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recalculated the national interest to reflect that it is no longer 
sufficient simply to be successful in international athletic 
competition. The United States’ success now must be coupled with 
the moral authority that it does not cheat.149 Thus, Congress and the 
Executive Branch Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
worked together on a new approach. As stated by former ONDCP 
Director Barry McCaffrey, the formation of WADA and USADA was 
necessary to help restore the “honor and integrity of  
U. S. sport.”150  
The formation of USADA in response to growing international 
pressure was driven by the ONDCP and the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Technology, particularly Senators John 
McCain and Ted Stevens. ONDCP advocated for the formation of a 
government agency with “certain governmental or quasi-
governmental powers.”151 ONDCP asserted that governmental status 
would significantly enhance such an agency’s credibility.152 ONDCP 
was careful to assert that while the drug testing entity it proposed 
needed to be an instrumentality of the United States, it must also 
reflect the free market view of sports regulation embodied in the 
Amateur Sports Act: “[W]e have to be very respectful of the notion 
of amateur sports and the independence of amateur sports from 
Federal intervention.”153 Yet, because of its importance to the 
United States’ image internationally, both ONDCP and Congress 
still had direct influence over how USADA would be structured and 
what its mission would be,154 with a key concern being that athletes 
accused of doping violations not be given full constitutional due 
process or privacy protections, which could impede aggressive 
 
 149. See id. at 69–70 (explaining the change of heart on doping by the United States and 
other Olympic superpowers as “seeking to ensure the continuing utility of international sport 
as a framework for diplomacy”). Houlihan also noted that the participation by the United 
States and other Olympic superpowers was due to a “reassessment” of national interests. Id. at 
71–72. 
 150. Cole, supra note 136, at 219. 
 151. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic 
Competition: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
106th Cong. 20 (1999) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 12. 
 154. See Koller, supra note 132, at 105–06; see also S. 529, supra note 133, at 3 
(statement of Jim Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic Comm.) (noting that the 
committee “had a hand in creating” the USADA). 
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enforcement.155 Thus, government officials who once ignored the 
doping problem in the pursuit of international sporting success now 
fear that giving athletes meaningful due process protections will 
cause us to fall behind in our effort to catch cheaters. As stated by 
Senator John McCain, “The fact remains that we may be falling 
behind in what is truly an arms race of doping.”156 Similarly, former 
USOC president Scott Blackmun openly questioned whether 
protections for accused athletes have a place in the fight against 
doping, asking whether “those fundamental notions of due process 
[should] really have application in sport and doping?”157 USADA 
Executive Terrence Madden has echoed these concerns in testimony 
before Congress, stating that “the rights of clean athletes are too 
long, too often ignored or not mentioned in the media. Those are 
the rights we have to be concerned with, those are the rights that 
USADA wants to address, the rights of clean athletes.”158 In this 
respect, anti-doping advocates share the view of proponents of 
privatization, who have argued that due process “is nothing but ‘a 
web of bureaucratic red tape driven by concerns over process and 
inputs and not outcomes.’” 159 
Thus, USADA was not given government agency status. It was 
established and began operations on October 1, 2000,160 as a private, 
not-for-profit corporation.161 Through legislation, Congress has 
“designated” USADA as the “independent anti-doping 
organization” for the United States, mandating that USADA 
conduct all Olympic Movement drug testing.162 Congress has also 
 
 155. Koller, supra note 132, at 109–10 (“Even before USADA was created, there were 
concerns that the United States would not be able to establish an effective anti-doping agency 
because of constitutional rights of privacy and due process.”). 
 156. S. 529, supra note 133, at 3 (opening statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. 
Senator from Arizona).  
 157. White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports, Proceedings: First Meeting of the 
White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports 56 (Dec. 7, 2000) (statement of Scott 
Blackmun). 
 158. Terrence Madden, supra note 137, at 3. 
 159. Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization and Public 
Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 120 (quoting Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward 
M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2003)). 
 160. USADA—Who We Are: USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/ 
history.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
 161. Tygart, supra note 125, at 127. 
 162. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-469, § 701, 120 Stat. 3502, 3534 (2006). 
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stated that USADA shall “ensure that athletes participating in 
amateur athletic activities recognized by the United States Olympic 
Committee are prevented from using performance-enhancing drugs 
or performance-enhancing genetic modifications accomplished 
through gene-doping.”163 To that end, Congress provides the 
majority of USADA’s funding.164 Curiously, the USADA’s status and 
the requirement that it conduct Olympic Movement drug testing are 
not part of the Amateur Sports Act. The very brief legislation that 
outlines its funding and duties is part of an Office of National Drug 
Control Policy funding statute.165 Notwithstanding its low profile 
legally, USADA has already paid dividends on the international 
relations front. As stated by former USOC Chief Executive Jim 
Scherr, USADA’s actions have “largely dispelled what was previously 
a widespread international impression that some American athletes 
were drug cheaters with their behavior condoned by their respective 
sports federations.”166 
What most distinguishes the sportive nationalism expressed 
through the federal government’s establishing the USADA and its 
participating in the anti-doping movement is the government’s 
motivation to rely on the private sector. With the President’s 
Commission on Olympic Sports and the resulting Amateur Sports 
Act, the government chose to rely on the private sector as a means of 
distinguishing the structure of the United States’ Olympic sports 
system from its state-sponsored, Communist counterparts. The 
government was expressing sportive nationalism through its choice 
of how to develop and train Olympic Movement athletes and, in 
doing so, showing the world the strength of traditional American 
values—particularly the principles of individualism and free 
enterprise. 
However, with its anti-doping initiatives, the federal government 
was not interested in establishing the USADA as a private entity to 
 
 163. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 701(b)(2). 
 164. Terrence Madden, supra note 137, at 3 (“As Jim stated, most of our funding now 
comes from the federal government.”); see also Office of National Drug Control Policy 
Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 703 (authorizing appropriations of $9,700,000 for fiscal year 
2007 and $10,300,000 for fiscal year 2008). 
 165. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Title VII, Sec. 
701. 
 166. S. 529, supra note 133, at 4. Scherr also noted that the USADA has “expanded its 
scope of activity, increased its aggressiveness and greatly improved its overall effectiveness of 
operation, earning widespread respect both domestically and internationally.” Id. 
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contrast it with state-controlled systems—the Cold War was long 
over. Instead, the government was interested in avoiding 
constitutional restraint and enhancing its international image in the 
most expedient way possible.167 In the privatization debate, it is this 
deliberate avoidance of constitutional restraint that is particularly 
problematic,168 and considered “illegitimate.”169 Examples of how 
the USADA functions as a government “partner” are illustrative. For 
instance, prior to the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, the federal 
government raided a San Francisco area entity, the Bay Area 
Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO),170 that it alleged was distributing 
illegal performance-enhancing substances to professional and 
Olympic athletes.171 One of the substances was specifically 
manufactured to be undetectable in standard drug tests.172 Shortly 
after this raid, the United States Senate took the “unprecedented”173 
step of subpoenaing the secret grand jury documents that were 
connected to the raid; then it turned the documents over174 to the 
USADA with the express purpose of disqualifying the athletes who 
apparently had obtained performance-enhancing substances from 
BALCO.175 The BALCO investigation was not an exception; in fact, 
the USADA partners with the government regularly to develop 
evidence and pursue sanctions against athletes.176 For instance, the 
USADA has continued to work with the government on a variety of 
 
 167. See infra notes 192–93. 
 168. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1309 (2003). 
 169. Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization and Public 
Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL. 111, 123–24 (2005). 
 170. Mark Zeigler, Raid on Nutrition Firm a Battle in the Doping War, S.D. UNION-
TRIBUNE, Sept. 6, 2003, at D3. 
 171. David Wharton & Alan Abrahamson, Four Accused of Supplying Illegal Drugs to 
Athletes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 172. Michael O’Keefe, Report: Feds Raid ‘Clear’ Lab, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, at 
66. 
 173. S. 529, supra note 133, at 2 (statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from 
Alaska) (“The actions we took as a Committee last year ensured that the United States did not 
send athletes who were not drug free to Athens. Those were unprecedented actions . . . .”). 
 174. See Michaelis, supra note 13 (quoting USADA CEO Terrence Madden stating that 
the documents subpoenaed by the Senate Commerce Committee and forwarded to the 
USADA were “‘the whole ballgame’ in terms of convicting some athletes”). 
 175. Terrence Madden, supra note 137 (thanking the committee for providing the 
documents that enabled the USADA to win all of its BALCO-related actions against athletes). 
 176. Michaelis, supra note 13 (“[BALCO] highlighted the importance of government 
involvement in building anti-doping cases.”). 
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investigations involving the sale and distribution of performance-
enhancing drugs, and it is contemplated that the government will 
provide the USADA once again with any evidence of purchases by 
Olympic Movement athletes.177 The use of state power to achieve 
these results, and the deliberate avoidance of Constitutional restraint 
by relying on the private sector, poses a troubling threat to athletes’ 
individual rights, as the pursuit of prestige through doping 
convictions can be viewed as the government achieving indirectly 
what it could not do directly.178 
B. Targeting High-Profile Athletes 
Sportive nationalism manifest through the anti-doping 
movement is illustrated in the first instance in efforts to target 
athletes in sports that, internationally, get the most attention.179 In 
fact, the WADA Code explicitly supports the practice of targeting 
high-profile athletes even in the absence of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.180 The strong international consensus against 
athlete doping has meant this targeting takes ever-greater urgency, as 
the United States no longer wants to appear as if it ignores athlete 
doping. In contrast, it wants to show the world that it can and will 
take action against high-profile athletes. At least one athlete has 
made such a claim before Congress, essentially alleging that prior to 
the 2004 Olympics, the government worked to remove athletes in 
sports with a high international profile and turned a blind eye to the 
others. As stated by sprinter Kelli White:181  
 
 177. See Amy Shipley, A Wider Front in the Doping Battle: Law Enforcement Takes the 
Lead in Sports Probes, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2007, at A1. 
 178. I have argued previously that USADA’s “partnering” with the federal government in 
some cases might be viewed by courts as “joint action” sufficient for a finding of state action. 
Koller, supra note 132. 
 179. This targeting can amount to “selective prosecution,” and it can have troubling 
racial implications, with athletes in sports such as track and field, heavily composed of African-
American athletes, the most frequently tested. See United States v. Christopher Lee Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456, 476 (1996) (citing United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 
14–15 (1926)); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). 
 180. See World Anti-Doping Code § 5.1.3 [hereinafter WADA Code]. The comment to 
this provision suggests testing “world class [a]thletes, [a]thletes whose performances have 
dramatically improved over a short period of time, [and] [a]thletes whose coaches have had 
other [a]thletes test positive.” Id. 
 181. See Cole, supra note 136, at 221 (commenting on the negative perceptions of the 
United States in general and with respect to doping, and illustrating how the Government’s 
actions surrounding the BALCO scandal were meant to counter this negative image). Cole 
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Although I have been troubled by the disparity of the penalties 
facing track athletes versus other sports, I am mindful we are not 
protected by a players’ association. I appreciate the many reasons 
why this committee previously subpoenaed the BALCO documents 
pertaining only to the track and field athletes and turned them over 
to USADA, rather than the other sports, but would like to see 
more equal treatment of all sports.182  
Yet, sportive nationalism does not give the government or the 
USADA, acting on behalf of the government, the incentive to 
equally pursue other sports. Given the United States’ past 
international reputation as “cheaters,” especially in sports like track 
and field and cycling, the incentive is to target those sports for 
testing and sanctions because of the greater international currency in 
doing so. Thus far that has been the case.183  
In addition, the USADA has also targeted athletes by attempting 
to obtain evidence on others by offering plea deals. While this 
undoubtedly helps USADA “clean up sport,” it also reflects that 
international prestige is an important backdrop upon which the 
“cleaning up” is done. For instance, it was widely reported that after 
Floyd Landis allegedly tested positive for performance-enhancing 
drug use after the 2006 Tour de France, the USADA offered him a 
“plea deal” of sorts if he would provide information about American 
cyclist and seven-time Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong.184 
Many in the international sporting community believed that 
Armstrong used performance-enhancing substances, and seeking 
such evidence, long after Armstrong retired from cycling, seemed 
less about regulating sport and more about international prestige. 
 
states that Kelli White “has just been drafted in America’s latest ‘truth’ campaign. White . . . 
became the first official victim of the BALCO scandal . . . . [Her] admission that she used 
steroids and erythropoietin . . . and her willingness to actively clean up sport (she has 
apparently agreed to be an informant) were made into a progress report.” Id. 
 182. S. 529, supra note 133, at 8. 
 183. USADA’s most recent testing data shows that for 2006, approximately 30% of 
USADA’s testing efforts were directed at Track and Field and Cycling. See http:// 
www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual_report_2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2008). See generally, Michaelis, supra note 13 (describing the testing and investigation of 
various track and field athletes). 
 184. Bonnie DeSimone, Landis Says Lawyer Asked Him to Implicate Armstrong, 
ESPN.com, May 10, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=2866845 
(noting Floyd Landis’s claim that the USADA had offered him and his lawyer a reduction in 
Landis’s penalty if he provided information that Lance Armstrong had engaged in doping 
during his career). 
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C. Lack of Meaningful Due Process 
Perhaps the most troubling manifestation of sportive nationalism 
through the anti-doping movement is the lack of meaningful due 
process protections for athletes accused of doping violations. In the 
Cold War Era, United States sportive nationalism presented few 
threats to athletes’ constitutional rights. At that time, the 
government’s interest in participating in the Olympic Movement, 
and doing so successfully, usually aligned with athletes’ interest in 
competing. Thus, the government’s interest at that time was 
facilitating the development of skilled athletes and supporting their 
efforts to compete. In addition, during this time, athletes did not 
pursue their sport as a career but as an avocation. Opportunities for 
endorsements and other earnings related to sport were limited, and 
training generally was not a full time job. Today, however, the 
practice of sportive nationalism has changed dramatically. The 
government remains interested in producing successful athletes, but 
it now wants to do so with moral authority. Thus, the government 
no longer wants solely to promote eligibility, but in fact can gain 
international currency from declaring athletes ineligible when it is 
believed that they have used performance-enhancing substances. 
Thus, the new sportive nationalism provides little incentive to 
provide accused athletes with meaningful due process protections. 
This change of position is increasingly important because it comes at 
a time when a strong case can be made that athletes have a liberty 
and property interest185 in their sporting careers.186  
 
 185. The due process interests that would be implicated in this context are those 
protected under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, as the regulation of Olympic 
Movement athletes arguably involves action by the federal government. 
 186. I have previously made the case that although the United States Olympic 
Committee and the United States Anti-Doping Agency are nominally private entities, they 
operate with such significant federal government involvement that in some cases they can be 
held to be “state actors” such that Constitutional restrictions would apply to their actions. 
Koller, supra note 132; Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s 
Application to Amateur Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183 (2008). This Article accordingly 
assumes that state action, at least in some cases, is present and focuses on the constitutional 
liberty and property interests that are at stake when an athletes’ eligibility is limited or 
terminated. 
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1. Olympic Movement athletes have a property right in their eligibility 
In the early 1970s, when the federal government considered 
ways to use Olympic Movement sport to gain international prestige, 
athletes truly were amateurs. By and large, sport was not an athlete’s 
career or livelihood. Courts did not recognize any right to compete 
in Olympic Movement sport.187 The opportunity to compete was 
considered a mere privilege.188 Today, the landscape has changed 
dramatically.189 With technical advancements in training and the 
organization brought about by the Amateur Sports Act,190 United 
States athletes have become highly successful in Olympic Movement 
competition. The rewards for athletes are in many cases substantial. 
The Olympic Games themselves are a billion-dollar enterprise, and 
Olympic Movement athletes pursue their sports as careers.191 
Athletes dedicate years to training to achieve their elite status, 
making it difficult to hold employment outside of their sport. 
Frequently, elite athletes delay preparing for a “traditional” career 
while they pursue their career in sport.192 Elite Olympic Movement 
athletes rely on training stipends, earnings, and endorsements tied to 
 
 187. Michels v. USOC, 741 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the principal 
purpose of the Amateur Sports Act was to provide a means of settling disputes between 
organizations seeking to be NGBs for a particular sport and contains no express private right of 
action); DeFrantz v. USOC, 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding there is no right held 
by amateur athletes to compete in the Olympic Games). 
 188. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting Mitchell v. La. High Sch. Athletics Ass’n, 
430 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970)).  
 189. C. Christine Ansley, International Athletic Dispute Resolution: Tarnishing the 
Olympic Dream, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277 (1995). 
 190. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2000). 
 191. Michael Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in 
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 546 (2002) (“By granting athletes . . . a limited 
right to compete, we recognize the reality that Olympic caliber athletes now earn a living and 
make a career of their sport. To argue that Olympic athletes do not have the same job and 
career interests in participating in their sports as accountants, doctors, or lawyers have in 
working in their professions devalues the years of preparation Olympic athletes have 
invested.”). 
 192. Comprehensive Study Reveals Career Challenges for Olympians; Monster.com and the 
USOC Create Tools for Athletes to Prepare for Life After the Olympic Games, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 
16, 2001, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/sports-recreation/amateur-sports-
olympics/6180836-1.html (explaining that seventy percent of Olympic athletes surveyed were 
concerned that their competitive careers delayed their pursuit of their professional goals: 
“Given the rigorous training schedule of Olympic athletes, it is easy to understand why 
preparing for a career may be put on hold”); Olympic Stars Get a Restart in the Race for Jobs, 
FIN. TIMES, May 9, 2005 (noting that for Olympic athletes, dedicating a significant part of 
their lives to their sporting careers comes at “the expense of formal education”). 
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their sport to make ends meet.193 This is the case for most, if not all, 
modern Olympians for whom sports competition is equivalent to 
employment, and the financial benefits can be in the millions.194 Yet 
competing at this level may only come after an athlete has met the 
eligibility requirements of the United States Olympic Committee195 
and, by extension, the United States Anti-Doping Agency. These 
entities hold the power of stripping an athlete of his or her eligibility 
and effectively ending his or her athletic career.196 Unlike 
 
 193. Once they achieve a certain level, athletes receive money from the USOC and their 
NGB training stipends and other benefits to support them as long as they maintain their 
eligibility for Olympic Movement competition. United States Olympic Committee National 
Anti-Doping Policies, Annex C at 23. For instance, athletes receive direct support that is not 
tied to particular competitive results as well as “result based” support, tuition grants and access 
to the Olympic Training Center and Olympic Training sites, including residences. 
 194. For instance, it is estimated that Michael Phelps could earn between $30 million and 
$50 million in endorsements after eclipsing Marc Spitz’s record of seven gold medals during 
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Michael Sokolove, Built to Swim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2004. Track and field athletes such as Carl Lewis earned $50,000 to $100,000 for appearances 
with annual incomes over $1 million. Trip Gabriel, The Runner Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 
1992. Even lesser known athletes, like Brad Ludden, a whitewater kayaker, can earn $100,000 
for endorsements and speaking appearances. Wendy Knight, Paddling in the Doldrums, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2004. 
 195. Those eligibility standards are determined by the National Governing Bodies for 
sport recognized by the USOC, 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(1) (explaining that an “amateur 
athlete” for purposes of the Amateur Sports Act is one “who meets the eligibility standards 
established by the national governing body or paralympic sports organization for the sport in 
which the athlete competes”). Eligibility is also determined by the USOC pursuant to its 
agreement with the USADA with respect to drug testing. United States Olympic Committee 
National Anti-Doping Policies §§ 1, 14. 
 196. The Amateur Sports Act provides that the USOC has the exclusive authority to 
regulate the Olympic Movement in the United States. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3)(A) (“The 
purposes of the [USOC] are . . . to exercise exclusive jurisdiction . . . over all matters 
pertaining to the United States participation in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, 
and the Pan-American Games, including representation of the United States in the Games; and 
. . . (4) to obtain for the United States . . . the most competent amateur representation 
possible in each event of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games and Pan-American 
Games.”). In addition, Congress has provided that the USADA is the independent entity 
responsible for the regulation of Olympic athlete doping in the United States. P.L. 109-469, 
Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Dec. 29, 2006 § 
701(b)(1). Under the United States Olympic Committee’s National Anti-Doping Policies,  
if an athlete . . . is found to be ‘ineligible’ on account of an anti-doping rule 
violation, the athlete will not be permitted to (i) participate in the Olympic, Pan 
American, or Paralympic Games, trials, or qualifying events; (ii) be a member of an 
Olympic, Pan American, or Paralympic Games Team or staff; or (iii) have access to 
the training facilities of an Olympic Training Center or other programs and activities 
of the USOC, including, but not limited to grants, awards or employment. 
United States Olympic Committee National Anti-Doping Policies, § 6. 
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professional athletes, Olympic athletes have no union to protect their 
interest in their sporting careers. This, coupled with the federal 
government’s undeniable practice of sportive nationalism, can 
threaten athletes’ legitimate liberty and property interest in their 
sporting careers if they are not given meaningful due process to 
defend their eligibility.197 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution provide that the state shall not “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”198 The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the protections afforded by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clauses apply only to 
actions taken by the state, and not private conduct, “no matter how 
unfair that conduct may be.”199 In some circumstances, a strong case 
can be made that the USADA engages in “state action” sufficient to 
trigger Constitutional protections.200 The next question, then, 
assuming there is state action, is whether Olympic Movement 
athletes are being afforded due process of law when their eligibility is 
terminated. The Supreme Court has stated that procedural due 
 
 197. Whether an athlete has a property interest in competing in their chosen sport has 
been the subject of substantial litigation. Most cases have found that athletes at the high school 
and college level do not have such a protected interest. These cases are premised on the notion 
that student participation in athletics is an extracurricular activity and not a student’s career. 
Maroney v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 764 F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 1985); In re U.S. ex 
rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147, 153 n.8 (8th Cir. 1982) (“A student’s 
interest in participating . . . in a single year of interscholastic athletics amounts to a mere 
expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement.”); Walsh v. La. High 
Sch. Athletics Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1980) (“A student’s interest in participating 
. . . in interscholastic athletics amounts to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally 
protected claim of entitlement.”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124; Brands v. Sheldon Cmty. Sch., 
671 F. Supp. 627, 631 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (“A clear majority of courts addressing this question 
in the context of interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics have found that athletes have no 
legitimate entitlement to participate.”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 
863, 865 (Tex. 2005) (“We held twenty years ago . . . like ‘the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions’ construing other constitutional guarantees of due process, that ‘students do not 
possess a constitutionally protected interest in their participation in extracurricular activities.’”); 
Letendre v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 86 S.W. 3d 63, 69 (Mo. App. 2002). 
However, courts have been willing to recognize that there may be a property right where, for 
instance, a college scholarship is involved, Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 
1982) (holding the award of a college scholarship may create a property interest in its 
continuation); Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987).  
 198. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 199. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988); see also 
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citations omitted). 
 200. Koller, supra note 132. 
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process issues are examined using a two-step process.201 First, the 
Court looks at whether the aggrieved individual has “a liberty or 
property interest which has been interfered with by the State.”202 
The second step is to determine “whether the procedures attendant 
upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”203 
Olympic Movement athletes today can make a strong case that 
they have protected property and liberty interests in their athletic 
eligibility. The Supreme Court has held that it is the “nature” of the 
interest at stake that determines whether due process requirements 
apply and not the weight,204 as the procedural protection of property 
interests is aimed at providing security for the interests an individual 
has acquired in specific benefits.205 In an oft-quoted passage, the 
Supreme Court has stressed that “to have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. 
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”206 A 
property interest is created207 and its limits defined by “existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent source”208 such as 
state law, but “federal constitutional law determines whether that 
interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ 
 
 201. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (explaining that due 
process issues are resolved using “what has become a familiar two-part inquiry: we must 
determine whether [the claimant] was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process 
was his due”). 
 202. Ky. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citing Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 332 (1976). 
 203. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 458 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). 
 204. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (“[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in 
the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake.”). 
 205. Id. at 575. 
 206. Id. 
 207. In considering the variety of property and liberty interests that qualify for due 
process protections, the Court has “eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations,” id. at 572, 
noting that “‘liberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms. They are among the ‘great 
[constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience. . . . They 
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this 
Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.’” Id. at 571 (quoting 
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Justice Frankfurter’s words are particularly pertinent in the Olympic Movement context, as the 
nature of the interests at stake have dramatically changed over the last several decades. 
 208. Id. at 577; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
KOLLER.FIN 11/25/2008 11:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1504 
protected by the Due Process Clause.”209 The Court has explained 
that “the hallmark of property” is an entitlement “which cannot be 
removed except ‘for cause.’”210 The Supreme Court has made clear 
that a benefit is not an entitlement subject to due process protection 
if it may be granted or denied in the exercise of government officials’ 
discretion.211 The Court has explained that once an entitlement that 
cannot be removed except “for cause” is found, the actual types of 
interests that constitute property subject to constitutional protection 
“are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating ‘to the whole 
domain of social and economic fact.’”212 
Such varying interests deserving of constitutional protection are 
illustrated in the Court’s due process jurisprudence. For example, in 
Perry v. Sindermann, the plaintiff’s terms of employment, including 
mutual understandings between him and his employer not included 
in a contract, defined the relevant property interest.213 In that case, a 
teacher without formal tenure pointed to specific circumstances and 
understandings that could establish an entitlement in continued 
employment.214 The Court held, therefore, that he was entitled to a 
hearing and opportunity to challenge the grounds for his 
termination.215 Similarly, in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. 
Craft, the Supreme Court held that utility customers had a 
 
 209. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755 (2005) (quoting Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)). 
 210. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citing Memphis Light, 
436 U.S. at 11–12; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975); Bd. of Regents of State 
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972)). 
 211. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756; see, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekoma, 461 U.S. 238, 
248–52 (1983) (finding no protected interest in a state’s process for transferring prisoners to 
out-of-state prisons because the decision can be made “for whatever reason or for no reason at 
all”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Damschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (finding no liberty 
interest in a state’s process for pardons because the decision is left to the discretion of 
administrators); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442–44 (1979) (no protected interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to pro hac vice appearance of counsel because it is left to the discretion 
of the trial court). 
 212. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 (quoting Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 
582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 213. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 214. Id. at 599–600 (explaining that the teacher relied upon a provision in the faculty 
handbook that assured a faculty member “tenure” as long as his teaching was “satisfactory” 
and he maintained a positive attitude with respect to his work). 
 215.  Id. at 602–03 (“[S]uch proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at 
his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge 
their sufficiency.”). 
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“legitimate claim of entitlement” in their utility service where state 
law provided that the service could only be terminated “for 
cause.”216 Moreover, in Hewitt v. Helms the Court held that a 
prisoner acquired a protected liberty interest in remaining in the 
general prison population, with greater freedoms, that could not be 
denied without due process.217 The Court found significant the 
Pennsylvania statutes and prison regulations which “used language of 
an unmistakably mandatory character” in requiring that certain 
procedures must be employed and certain substantive predicates 
must be met before a prisoner would be segregated from the general 
population.218 
Finally, in Logan v. Zimmerman, the Court found that a plaintiff 
had a property right in a state statute which allowed him to file a 
claim of disability discrimination against his employer.219 In that case, 
the state agency charged with investigating his complaint had not 
done so within the statutorily created time frame. The state court 
held that the plaintiff’s cause of action was therefore extinguished.220 
The plaintiff argued that extinguishing his claim because of the 
state’s failure to follow the statute deprived him of due process.221 
The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that the right of the plaintiff 
to avail himself of the statute’s adjudicatory procedures “share [the] 
characteristics” of other protected property interests.222 The Court 
explained that his right to redress of his grievance was guaranteed by 
state law and that his claim would be assessed under what amounts 
 
 216. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1978) (“Because 
petitioners may terminate service only ‘for cause,’ respondents assert a ‘legitimate claim of 
entitlement’ within the protection of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 217. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470–71 (1983) (“[W]e conclude in the light of the 
Pennsylvania statutes and regulations here in question . . . that respondent did acquire a 
protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population.”). 
 218. Id. at 471–72 (“[O]n balance we are persuaded that the repeated use of explicitly 
mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a 
conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.”); see also Ky. Dep’t of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (“[T]he most common manner in which 
a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official 
decision-making, and further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that 
the relevant criteria have been met.”). 
 219. Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 427 (1982). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 426–27. 
 222. Id. at 429. 
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to a “for cause” standard.223 Moreover, the Court found that his 
cause of action had value and was “at least as substantial” as the 
other interests that the Court had found deserving of protection.224 
Other protected property interests recognized by the Court include a 
horse trainer’s license,225 disability benefits,226 public education,227 
driver’s licenses,228 welfare benefits,229 and professional licenses.230 
In contrast, the Court declined to recognize a protected property 
interest in the landmark case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, where the Court considered whether a non-tenured assistant 
professor at a state university had a property right in his appointment 
such that he was entitled to notice and a hearing on the decision not 
to rehire him.231 The Court held that he did not have such a right, 
explaining that, first, the state had not refused to rehire him in 
connection with any charge that “might seriously damage his 
standing and associations in his community,”232 and it did not 
impose a stigma on him that would damage his ability to secure new 
employment.233 The Court explained that in such a case the 
university would have to grant notice and a sufficient hearing.234 In 
addition, noting that property rights are created and defined by 
“existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law,”235 the Court explained that no such rules 
and understandings were created by the terms of his appointment, 
which “secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 68 (1979). 
 226. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). 
 227. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975). 
 228. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 543 (1971). 
 229. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
 230. Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 
551–52 (1968). 
 231. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972). 
 232. Id. at 573 (“Had it done so, this would be a different case. For ‘where a person’s 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing 
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.’”). 
 233. Id. (“[T]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future 
opportunity for it certainly is no small injury.”). 
 234. Id. at 572. 
 235. Id. at 577 (explaining that this “independent source” must provide for “rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits”). 
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year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to 
re-employment.”236 In these circumstances, the Court found that the 
professor had no property interest that was sufficient to require the 
university to give him notice and a hearing before declining to renew 
his contract.237 Similarly, in the recent case of Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, the Court considered whether a woman whose restraining 
order against her estranged husband had a property interest in its 
enforcement where the town police officers failed to properly enforce 
it.238 The Court held that because state law did not make 
enforcement of the restraining order mandatory but left it to the 
discretion of police officers, the woman did not have a property right 
that would trigger due process protections.239 
In the case of the United States Olympic Movement, athletes can 
point to specific rules and understandings that create a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to their continued eligibility for purposes of the 
rules against doping.240 This entitlement is created because the 
totality of the rules and understandings of Olympic Movement 
competition are that athletes may only have their eligibility 
terminated, for purposes of a doping violation, for cause. Moreover, 
the mandatory nature of the language used to outline the procedures 
under which the eligibility can be terminated support the notion that 
Olympic Movement athletes have a property interest in their 
continued eligibility. The United States Olympic Committee 
National Anti-Doping Policies and the World Anti-Doping Code, 
which the USOC has adopted241 and the USADA must follow242 in 
 
 236. Id. at 578 (“[There was no] state statute or University rule or policy that secured his 
interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it.”). 
 237. Id. at 578. 
 238. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 752–55 (2005). 
 239. Id. at 763–65. 
 240. Although eligibility in terms of athletic skill is determined by an athletes’ NGB, and 
is usually subject to the NGB’s discretion, the rules which determine eligibility under 
applicable doping rules are not subject to discretion. This Article, then, makes a distinction 
between a claim of entitlement in eligibility based on skill, and one based on doping, and 
argues that it is a claim of entitlement in eligibility for purposes of the doping rules that is 
legitimate. 
 241. United States Olympic Committee National Anti-Doping Policies, § 1 (“[T]he 
United States Olympic Committee hereby adopts the rules [of the World Anti-Doping 
Code]”), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/policies_procedures/USOC 
Anti-Doping Policies.pdf. 
 242. United States Anti-Doping Agency Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing, § 3(a) 
(“In conducting drug testing and results management under this Protocol for Olympic 
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prosecuting accused athletes, provides for specific substantive 
predicates to be fulfilled before an athlete may lose her eligibility 
based on a doping violation.243 These include a finding that a doping 
violation has occurred under the terms of the World Anti-Doping 
Code. Less formally, but no less clearly, Olympic regulators have 
publicly stated that athletes will not lose their eligibility on the basis 
of a doping violation except for cause, stating that athletes are 
provided with “all the rights based upon the United States 
 
Movement Testing . . . USADA will be bound by . . . [t]hose Articles of the WADA Code 
which must be incorporated into the rules of every Anti-Doping Organization 
 . . .”), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/policies_procedures/2004 
usadaprotocol[3].pdf. 
 243. The United States Olympic Committee National Anti-Doping Policies specifically 
state that “[n]o athlete . . . shall be denied eligibility within the meaning of . . . these policies 
without first being afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the USADA Protocol for 
Olympic Movement Testing (“USADA Protocol”) incorporated into the contract between the 
USOC and USADA.” § 8. The USADA Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing states first 
that “all samples collected by USADA shall be analyzed only in WADA-accredited laboratories 
or as otherwise approved by WADA. § 7. The Protocol goes on to require that  
Upon receipt of a positive laboratory A report . . . USADA will promptly notify  
the . . . athlete . . . and shall advise the athlete of the date on which the laboratory 
will conduct the B sample analysis. . . . USADA shall provide to the athlete the A 
sample laboratory documentation . . . . A sample shall not be considered positive 
until after the B sample analysis confirms the A sample analysis or the athlete has 
expressly waived the B sample analysis. 
§ 8(b). Upon receiving the report on the “B” sample, the Protocol requires that “USADA 
shall promptly notify the athlete . . . . USADA shall then provide to the athlete the B sample 
documentation package . . .” § 8(c). Once the laboratory has confirmed the positive test result, 
the Protocol then specifies that “USADA shall address that case through the following results 
management procedures . . . .” § 9(a)–(c). Finally, if USADA decides to proceed with the case, 
the Protocol provides that “USADA shall notify the athlete . . . what specific charges or alleged 
violations will be adjudicated and what sanction . . . USADA is seeking to have imposed.” § 
10(a). At that point, the athlete may invoke the hearing procedures provided for under the 
Protocol. Id. With respect to the hearing, the World Anti-Doping Code (“WADA Code”) 
states that “the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-
doping rule violation has occurred.” WADA Code § 3.1, available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf. Also pursuant to the WADA, there is a specific 
procedure for analyzing an athlete’s urine sample before a positive result may be found. Section 
6.1 states that “Doping Control Samples shall be analyzed in accordance with the following 
principles: . . . Doping Control Samples shall be analyzed only in WADA-accredited laboratories 
or as otherwise approved by WADA.” Moreover, the WADA states that “[l]aboratories shall 
analyze Doping Control Samples and report results in conformity with the International 
Standard for laboratory analysis.” § 6.4. Olympic regulators could not plausibly argue that the 
property right held by athletes is limited by the procedures outlined for its “deprivation,” as 
the “bitter with the sweet” approach to due process rights has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
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Constitution and our judicial system.”244 Thus, it can be argued that 
Olympic Movement athletes have a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to continuation of their eligibility according to the rules and 
understandings of the United States Olympic Movement, which 
clearly establish that they will lose their eligible status only for cause. 
The totality of these explicit rules and understandings entitle an 
aggrieved athlete to meaningful245 due process before the athlete’s 
eligibility is revoked. 
Additionally, athletes’ claim to a property right in their eligibility 
is strengthened by the fact that a finding that an athlete has used 
performance-enhancing substances imposes an enormous stigma that 
affects an athlete’s future employment prospects. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that an individual can have a liberty interest 
sufficient to require due process protections where the state has 
damaged his or her reputation to the point that it forecloses future 
employment opportunities.246 In Paul v. Davis, the Court held that 
an individual who police had wrongfully featured on a flyer noting 
that he had been charged with shoplifting did not state a claim under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.247 The individual featured on the flyer 
claimed that publicly labeling him an “active shoplifter” violated a 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.248 The 
Court disagreed, explaining that “reputation alone” is not a 
protected liberty interest, thus holding that defamation alone by a 
public official fails to support a claim under the Due Process 
 
 244. Terrence Madden, supra note 137. 
 245. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). The Supreme Court has 
explained that the heart of meaningful due process is giving an individual an opportunity to be 
heard, before action is taken against him, so that factual errors can be corrected and discretion 
can be exercised, in light of the individual circumstances, to decline to take the planned action. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 532; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–83 (1975); Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1971). 
 246. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 
183, 190–91 (1952)) (explaining that the case before the Court simply involved damage to 
reputation, and was not “a case where government action has operated to bestow a badge of 
disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity”).  
 247. Id. at 695–99. 
 248. Id. at 695–97 (noting that the police flyer included the individual on the flyer 
because he had been arrested for shoplifting, although his guilt had never been established and 
the charges were ultimately dropped). 
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Clause.249 The Court clarified that damage to reputation, in 
combination with government action that deprives an individual of 
another right, such as foreclosing future employment opportunities, 
triggers Due Process protections.250 
This same type of harm is at issue in the Olympic Movement 
today where doping accusations threaten athletes’ eligibility.251 A 
determination by the USADA that an athlete is not eligible to 
compete because he or she has been found guilty of a doping offense 
carries just the sort of “stigma” with which the Supreme Court is 
concerned.252 Sanctions for an initial doping offense are a two-year, 
and in some cases four-year, ban on competition.253 Subsequent 
violations can mean a ban for life.254 The charge carries a powerful 
 
 249. Id. at 701 (“The words ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate for special protection over 
and above other interests that may be protected by state law . . . . [T]his line of cases does not 
establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as 
employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural 
protection of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 250. Id. at 706 (explaining that in prior cases it was the damage to reputation plus denial 
of other rights that triggered due process); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 
(1972) (explaining that defamation of an individual in connection with refusal to rehire could 
trigger Due Process protections); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (explaining that 
due process protections were triggered because the damage to the students’ reputation that 
resulted from being charged with misconduct was coupled with suspension from school); 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (holding that an individual was 
entitled to due process protections where she was labeled a hazard because of excessive 
drinking and forbidden to purchase alcoholic beverages, thus altering her rights under state 
law). 
 251. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (citations omitted) (“[W]here a person’s good name, 
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, 
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”).  
 252. See id. (explaining that in the case before the Court, there was no showing that “the 
State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability 
that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities”); Paul, 424 
U.S. at 711 (explaining that government-imposed stigma coupled with the alteration or 
extinguishing of a distinct right or status such as employment is sufficient to invoke the 
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause). Indeed, the “stigma” imposed by the 
doping allegation has been recognized by arbitrators in doping cases. Richard H. McLaren, An 
Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial Evidence Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 193, 209 (2006) (quoting USADA v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, ¶ 
36) (“In some civil cases—as here—the issues may involve questions of character and 
reputation and the ability to pursue one’s chosen career that can approach, if not transcend in 
importance even questions of personal liberty.”). 
 253. WADA Code §§ 10.2–10.4.2 (2003). 
 254. Id. at § 10.2. 
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quasi-criminal, moral stigma,255 and it significantly impedes the 
ability of an athlete to continue training and resume successful 
competition or be employed in an occupation related to Olympic 
Movement competition. There is little opportunity for an athlete 
found guilty of a doping offense to remain connected with the 
Olympic Movement in any way.256 Thus, being found guilty of 
doping essentially eliminates the possibility that an athlete can 
continue his or her sporting career, either as an athlete, coach, or the 
like. Moreover, the athlete’s endorsements, which can be a 
significant part of his or her annual income, are usually terminated in 
such a case. It is this ability to secure alternative employment that 
convinced the Supreme Court in Roth that the respondent did not 
have a liberty interest at stake. The Court noted that it does not 
implicate a liberty interest “when he simply is not rehired in one job 
but remains as free as before to seek another.”257 Here, an Olympic 
Movement athlete cannot pursue any other “job” related to Olympic 
Movement sport.258 Thus, an accusation by the USADA of doping is 
exactly the “nature” or type of injury that the Supreme Court has 
 
 255. See, e.g., Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1223 (2005). 
 256. See WADA Code § 10.9. 
No Person who has been declared ineligible may, during the period of Ineligibility, 
participate in any capacity in a Competition or activity (other than authorized anti-
doping education or rehabilitation programs) authorized or organized by any 
Signatory or Signatory’s member organization. In addition, for any anti-doping rule 
violation . . . some or all sport-related financial support or other sport-related 
benefits received by such Person will be withheld . . . . 
Id. Indeed, even athletes who might be able to come back to competitive form after a doping 
ban will find that they are prevented from competing. AP Interview: Major European Meets 
Won’t Invite Athletes with Previous Doping Bans, March 3, 2008, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3275222&type=story (explaining that track and field 
athletes who have served doping suspensions would not be invited to participate in major 
European meets even when their eligibility is restored). 
 257. Roth, 408 U.S. at 575. 
 258. See United States Olympic Committee Anti-Doping Policies § 6 (2004). This ban 
on competition includes participation in other sports in which the athlete might achieve elite 
status, with the exception that if an athlete receives a ban of longer than four years, he or she 
may, after completing four years of ineligibility, compete in local sports events in a sport other 
than the one in which the athlete received the doping violation, but only as long as the local 
event was not “at a level that could otherwise qualify such Person directly or indirectly to 
compete in (or accumulate points toward) a national championship or International Event.” 
WADA Code § 10.9. 
KOLLER.FIN 11/25/2008 11:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1512 
identified as requiring meaningful due process.259 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that in certain circumstances 
restricting or terminating an individual’s ability to engage in a 
licensed profession is the deprivation of a liberty interest that is 
deserving of due process protections.260 Eligibility to participate in 
Olympic Movement competition can be viewed as holding a license 
to practice a chosen profession which deserves due process 
protection. 
A property interest in the eligibility of Olympic Movement 
athletes may not immediately seem like the type of property that is 
envisioned by due process scholars as justifying procedural 
protections.261 That is, we may not view sport as, intuitively or 
normatively, something that is significant enough to merit 
constitutional protection. And certainly, it might not now be 
fashionable to argue for a definition of property rights that would 
include Olympic Movement eligibility.262 However, viewing 
eligibility at this level of athletic competition can be the new 
property for the new millennium without unduly expanding our 
conception of property that qualifies for due process protection. 
Because of the significant changes in the social and political 
environment regarding the value and use of elite sport, the 
characteristics of constitutionally protected property are met. Those 
changes have brought about a significant economic component to 
competitive eligibility that was not previously present. Perhaps as a 
result of this undeniable economic interest that athletes now have, 
regulators have granted athletes the promise of not revoking 
eligibility unless it is for cause—a bona fide finding of a doping 
violation. These elements of “monetary value,” “entitlement,” and 
 
 259. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 574 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951)) (“For ‘to be deprived not only of present government 
employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury . . . .’”). 
 260.  See id. at 573–74 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238 
(1957)) (“[A] State, in regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot 
foreclose a range of opportunities ‘in a manner . . . that contravene[s] . . . due process . . . .’”); 
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999) (noting that the government cannot completely 
prohibit a person from engaging in a particular calling, but can reasonably regulate the 
profession); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550–551 (1968) (holding that disbarment 
proceedings must provide sufficient due process protections). But see United States v. 
Gonzales-Lopez, 584 U.S. 140, 141 (2006).  
 261. See generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
 262. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996). 
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“termination for cause” squarely fit the Supreme Court’s conception 
of property deserving of constitutional protection.263 Therefore, an 
argument for a property right in Olympic Movement eligibility is not 
premised on 1960s and 70s notions of government largesse and the 
welfare state. The claim of “entitlement” with respect to Olympic 
Movement athletes derives from notions of fundamental fairness. 
With the practice of sportive nationalism as entrenched as it is, it is 
simply no longer fair to allow the government to use athletes’ 
athletic careers for international relations benefits264 without giving 
them meaningful due process protections in return. As will be 
explained below, it is this lack of meaningful due process and the 
incentive the government has to withhold meaningful due process 
that threatens athletes’ constitutional rights. 
2. Athletes accused of doping are denied the meaningful procedural 
process to which they are due 
There are two components of procedural due process. First, 
procedural due process requires setting minimum procedures which 
are calibrated to minimize the risk of an erroneous decision or result 
given the interests that are at stake. Second, an important 
 
 263. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 
885, 961 (2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests a definition of a 
property right that looks to “whether nonconstitutional sources of law confer on the claimant 
an entitlement having a monetary value that can be terminated only upon a finding that some 
specific condition has been satisfied”). 
 264. See Shipley, supra note 13, at E01. 
In the matter of anti-doping, perception matters. Countries that haven’t adopted a 
hard line on the issue and whose athletes perform exceptionally well at major 
competitions might find the results greeted with skepticism . . . . Police actions in 
the United States in the last five years have resulted in sanctions or the threat of 
sanctions against more than a dozen athletes and helped restore the country’s 
reputation on anti-doping matters. “For so long, we were thought of as the biggest 
cheaters in the world,” said Scott M. Burns, deputy director for state and local 
affairs at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. 
Id.; Michaelis, supra note 13 (quoting Scott Burns as saying that “catching” Floyd Landis and 
Justin Gatlin helped the United States appear to be tougher on drug-using athletes). Such an 
image-enhancement can be achieved through sanctioning professional athletes as well, as 
doping regulators noted that the indictment of baseball star Barry Bonds proves that “the U.S. 
government is committed to healthy sport.” Paul Logothetis, U.S. Officials: Bonds Indictment 
Shows How Attitudes Have Changed in America, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2007, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-11-16-750269443_x.htm. 
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component of due process is following the established procedure.265 
Scholars have explained that the purpose of procedural due process is 
to ensure accurate decision-making—with “accurate” process defined 
as “one that finds the facts as they actually are and applies law to 
those facts in accordance with the prevailing doctrine.”266 Thus, 
procedural protections such as notice of the proposed action, a 
hearing, and a right to be represented by counsel are important 
because they help achieve an accurate result.267 “Underlying this 
concern for accuracy is a notion that inaccurate determinations are 
unfair to individuals.”268 Procedure, then, is meant to protect 
individuals from the “tyranny” and “oppression” of state agents 
exercising unfettered discretion.269 Thus, a person is denied due 
process of law when the state actor either failed to provide the 
required minimum procedural protections or when the state actor 
failed to follow established applicable rules.270 
For athletes accused of doping violations, there is questionable 
due process in both respects. First, the rules themselves fail to adhere 
to minimally required due process standards. Second, doping 
authorities often fail to follow their own rules. With respect to 
minimum procedures, because Olympic Movement athletes have a 
strong argument that they have a property interest in their athletic 
eligibility, under the Due Process Clause they are entitled to “some 
form” of a hearing before that eligibility is revoked based on an 
 
 265. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 
1047 (1984) (“Our generally accepted standards for fairness are that the government must 
follow applicable rules and provide a minimal level of procedural protection.”). 
 266. Id. at 1102. 
 267. See id. at 1109 (explaining that the connection between procedures such as notice, a 
hearing and an impartial decision-maker have a “virtually self-evident” connection to the due 
process goal of accurate decision making); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 474 
(1986) (explaining that the “instrumental conception” of procedural due process “focuses on 
the individual’s interest in having an opportunity to convince the decision-maker that he 
deserves the right at issue”); see generally Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due 
Process Adjudication—A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319 (1957). 
 268. Rubin, supra note 265, at 1102–03; see also Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness 
and Substantive Rights, NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 182–84 (1977); Kadish, supra note 
267, at 347–48. 
 269. See Rubin, supra note 265, at 1104 (“Procedure is our traditional method for 
ensuring that the decision in question is accurate, thus protecting individuals from the 
potential oppressions of direct interaction with state agents.”). 
 270. Id. at 1110. 
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allegation that the athlete used performance-enhancing substances.271 
Thus, the Supreme Court has explained that “due process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.”272 Specifically what, or how much, process is due when an 
individual’s liberty or property interests are in jeopardy is determined 
by balancing the competing interests that are at stake.273 The Court 
looks to the private interest that will be affected, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of the interest at stake through the procedures 
used and the value of additional safeguards, and the government’s 
interest, including the burdens that additional procedures would 
impose.274 
In terms of the private interest at stake when an athlete is 
accused of doping, scholars have noted that such allegations can be 
seen as “quasi-criminal” in nature and therefore “require a 
heightened level of fairness.”275 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that depriving an individual of the means to pursue 
his or her career and livelihood is a significant interest.276 These 
interests are intensified because the penalties meted out by doping 
regulators make it extremely difficult to resume successful Olympic 
Movement competition. While the World Anti-Doping Code 
previously mandated a two-year suspension for a first offense,277 
recent changes to the World Anti-Doping Code made the first-
offense sanction in some cases four years, effectively eliminating any 
significant opportunity for many athletes to resume competition.278 
 
 271. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)). The Supreme Court went on to explain that “the right to be 
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not 
involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” 
Id. at 333 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 272. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 273. Those interests include “the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest . . . .” 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–
43 (1985); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S 254, 263–66 (1970). 
 274. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
 275. Straubel, supra note 255, at 1223.  
 276. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S at 542 (citations omitted).  
 277. See WADA Code § 10.2 (2003). 
 278. Id. § 10.4.2. 
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Such a result denies athletes what is in many cases their primary 
source of income. 
These important private interests are balanced against the interest 
of the government in promoting “clean” competition and enhancing 
our nation’s image abroad. Thus, participating in worldwide anti-
doping regimes has provided a significant international relations 
benefit to the United States, and that cannot be taken lightly.279 
Similarly, the interest in “clean” competition has a variety of public 
policy implications, as government officials frequently stress that elite 
athletes are “role models” and that use of performance-enhancing 
substances by elite athletes encourages such use by children.280 In 
addition, because the USADA relies on relatively modest 
government funding as its primary source of revenue, it is 
undoubtedly interested in minimizing the costs of adjudication.281 
The interests at stake, then, can be seen as significant for both the 
government and individuals. 
It is undoubtedly this recognition that prompted doping 
regulators to adopt the notice and hearing procedures for athletes 
outlined in the World Anti-Doping Code and adopted by the 
USADA. These procedures include a “timely” hearing, a “fair and 
impartial” hearing body, the right to be represented by counsel, the 
right to be informed of the alleged doping violation and “a right to 
respond” to the allegation by presenting evidence, as well as calling 
and questioning witnesses, and a “timely, written, reasoned 
decision.”282 On the face of it, these procedures have all the 
trappings of “due” process, and a fairly generous amount of it, 
because athletes are given what appears to be ample opportunity to 
 
 279. Indeed, beyond the international relations benefits generally, participating in the 
worldwide fight against doping means that we are eligible to host future Olympic Games. 
Hersh, supra note 147, at 6 (explaining that under the WADA Code, the International 
Olympic Committee may only accept bids to host an Olympic Games only from countries 
which have ratified the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport and are in 
compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code). 
 280. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic 
Competition: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
106th Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden) (“We are seeing a public health crises 
with respect to these drugs in American youths.”). 
 281. WADA Code § 2.1.1, cmt. 2.1.1. 
 282. WADA Code § 8. 
KOLLER.FIN 11/25/2008 11:25 AM 
1465] Athletes’ Constitutional Rights 
 1517 
present a defense.283 It appears this way because procedural 
protections—like the opportunity to have a hearing, to be 
represented by an attorney, and to cross-examine witnesses, for 
instance—traditionally comport with the central purpose of 
procedural due process, which is to minimize the risk of an 
erroneous decision.284 Moreover, it would seem that, as in traditional 
due process cases, the interest in preventing an erroneous result is 
one that would be shared by both athletes and government-backed 
doping regulators, whose system might not long survive if it 
produces unjust results.285 
However, the Supreme Court has stated that with respect to due 
process, “we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine 
whether constitutional minimums have been honored.”286 Looking 
beyond the bare form of the procedures provided to athletes accused 
of doping, there are serious concerns over how fair this arbitration 
system really is.287 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the due 
process requirement is meant to protect the opportunity for an 
aggrieved individual to be heard in a “meaningful” manner.288 Thus, 
where an individual’s reputation is called into question to the point 
that he or she suffers a “stigma” that would harm future 
employment prospects, due process requires procedures that allow 
the accused individual a meaningful opportunity to refute the 
charges.289 In the context of student suspensions in public schools, 
for instance, the Supreme Court has explained that the opportunity 
to be heard is crucial so that “disciplinarians, although proceeding in 
utmost good faith,” can make informed decisions and avoid those 
 
 283. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1267, 1306 
(1974) (explaining the elements of a fair hearing, including an unbiased tribunal, notice of the 
proposed action, and an opportunity to present reasons why the action should not be taken). 
 284. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (“[P]rocedural due process 
rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process . . . .”).  
 285. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S 532, 544 (1985) (explaining 
that the government employer also shares the interest in avoiding erroneous decisions). 
 286. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971). 
 287. See Straubel, supra note 255, at 1223. 
 288. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1981); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) 
(emphasis supplied)). 
 289. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1972). 
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decisions which are not warranted.290 The “disciplinarians” in the 
case of anti-doping regulation may not simply be proceeding in a 
good faith attempt to find facts, but with eyes colored by sportive 
nationalism. In such a case, the opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way takes on even greater importance, yet procedural 
rules governing the hearing process significantly and, in most cases, 
fatally handicap the athlete’s opportunity to present his or her side of 
the doping story. In this respect, the current drug testing and 
adjudication regime adopted and administered by the USADA, 
through the World Anti-Doping Code,291 falls short of due process 
requirements. 292 
First, the hearing procedures fall short of due process 
requirements because they rely too heavily on presumptions that in 
practice are irrebuttable. The Supreme Court has stated that 
presumptions are permissible under the Due Process Clause where 
there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact 
presumed.293 In contrast, a presumption fails to meet due process 
requirements where it is “irrational” or “arbitrary” in that it cannot 
“be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more 
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to 
depend.”294 In the doping context, the presumptions in the World 
Anti-Doping Code are troubling because they effectively presume 
the ultimate fact. First, the tests that are used to determine whether 
an athlete has committed a doping violation are created by WADA 
and are presumed to be accurate. There is no formal procedure in 
place to challenge the accuracy of the test itself. In addition, it does 
 
 290. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). It is evident that mistakes are made. 
John Ruger, the USOC Athlete Ombudsman, speculates that the anti-doping system currently 
in place catches “two, three, five people every year who are not intentionally cheating.” 
Hiltzik, supra note 12. 
 291. Straubel supra note 255, at 1220 (explaining that “the substantive rules governing 
the question of whether a doping offense has occurred” are governed by the WADA Code). 
 292. The United States Government has considerable influence over the content of the 
Code and the conduct of WADA. Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions 
of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 95 (2005). The United 
States has an ONDCP representative on the WADA Board and it is WADA’s greatest financial 
supporter. Moreover, the WADA Code in many respects reflects important United States 
Government policy initiatives, such as banning marijuana, despite its very questionable 
performance-enhancing effects, so that the WADA Code would be in line with overall United 
States drug policy. Id. 
 293. Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943). 
 294. Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. 
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not follow that simply because WADA created a test, it in fact 
produces scientifically valid, accurate results. Moreover, the same labs 
that create tests through grants from WADA are also on the WADA-
accredited list to conduct testing on athletes’ samples. Experience 
has shown that the tests used by the accredited labs may not 
comport with accepted scientific principles. For instance, in the case 
involving cyclist Tyler Hamilton, USADA charged him with a 
doping offense based on the use of transfused blood. The arbitration 
panel found, two to one, that the test was scientifically accurate and 
it imposed sanctions on Hamilton. The dissenting arbitrator, in 
contrast, stated that “the WADA criteria has not been validated in a 
manner acceptable to the scientific community. It should not be 
used to test athletes at this time.”295 Moreover, the dissenting 
arbitrator noted that the criteria used by WADA to find a doping 
violation was a “subjective, qualitative approach” that was not 
appropriately peer reviewed and validated with an accounting of the 
rate of false positives.296 Thus, there is not necessarily a rational 
connection between the fact proved (that the sample went to a 
WADA accredited lab) and the fact presumed (that the test used is 
valid).297 
Second, it is upon this presumption—that the tests used are 
valid—that a second presumption rests: that the tests are conducted 
accurately. The Code contains a rule presuming that tests done in its 
labs, including the handling of an athlete’s sample as well as the 
conduct of the actual tests, are done correctly and in accordance with 
prevailing scientific protocols.298 Again, experience has shown that 
this presumption is an unfair one, as evidence discovered as part of 
the Floyd Landis arbitration showed that the employees at the 
WADA-accredited laboratory who declared his sample positive in 
 
 295. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Hamilton, AAA No 30 190 00130 05, at 6 (2005) 
(Campbell, arb., dissenting). 
 296. Id. at 5.  
 297. There is also a question over the test used to detect erythropoietin (EPO), a drug 
that increases stamina, requiring more than twenty-four hours, numerous complicated steps, 
sophisticated equipment and a high level of technical skill. Even with that, the results are 
highly susceptible to interpretation, and do not produce a clear “positive” or “negative” result. 
The test has been said to be prone to “false positives.” Hiltzik, supra note 12; Amy Shipley, 
Detection of HGH Met with Skepticism, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2007 (“The current blood test 
for HGH has significant shortcomings.”). 
 298. American Arbitration Association Supplementary Procedures for Arbitration of 
Olympic Sport Doping at R-33(e). 
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many cases did not know how to properly operate the machinery 
used to test his sample. Moreover, the fact proved (that a test was 
done) cannot in all cases have a rational connection to the fact 
presumed (that the test was done correctly) where the presumption 
is itself based on a presumption that the test is accurate. 
These presumptions are also procedurally problematic, not only 
because they have been shown to be factually incorrect, but also 
because they are in practice irrebuttable. WADA rules state that the 
accused athlete may rebut the presumption by establishing that the 
lab has departed from the required standards.299 However, while the 
athlete has to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the hearing panel may still disregard the fact that 
procedures were not followed if it is “comfortably satisfied” that the 
departure from established rules “did not change the test result.”300 
This is problematic for two reasons. First, WADA rules prohibit 
experts employed at any of the thirty-four accredited testing 
laboratories from testifying on behalf of an athlete accused of 
doping.301 Further, by USADA rule, athletes are privy only to 
documentation which pertains to the athlete’s own sample.302 No 
documentation will be provided that might expose any deficiencies 
or irregularities in the overall processes utilized by the laboratories. 
Second, as the experiences of Floyd Landis and others demonstrate, 
these labs and the tests they conduct are not without serious flaws.303 
 
 299. WADA Code § 3.2.1. 
 300. WADA Code, § 3.2.1 Comment. 
 301. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 6 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (Campbell, arb., dissenting) (quoting International Standards for Laboratories, Version 
4.0 adopted by the WADA Code); Michael Hiltzik, Presumed Guilty: Athletes See Doping Case 
Appeals as Futile Exercise, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006. The two arbitrators that ruled against 
Landis explained that “if WADA personnel were allowed to testify on behalf of Athletes this 
would have a significant impact on its ability to maintain solidarity and remain an ‘impartial 
tester’ of samples.” Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 82. 
 302. Hiltzik, supra note 12. 
 303. The dissenting opinion in Floyd Landis’ arbitration noted failures on several levels 
including: an incomplete chain of custody (“the documents used to show the chain of custody 
for Mr. Landis’s sample have no relationship to what actually happened to the samples in this 
Laboratory.”), the use of incorrect procedures to edit and destroy documents (“when your 
[results documentation] contains documents with a different sample number, documents with 
strike outs, [and] documents without proper forensic corrections . . . you do not have a reliable 
documentation package”), and the exclusion of Landis’ experts from the B sample testing 
stage. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 4, 6, 9–12 (2007) (Campbell, arb. dissenting). 
Landis even proved that the technicians who found his sample to be positive did not 
understand or lacked competence in significant areas of the testing process, as the panel noted 
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Yet, even if an athlete can show that the testing done on his or her 
sample was in violation of WADA’s own procedures, and, as in the 
case of Floyd Landis and Tyler Hamilton, if the tests and the results 
produced do not comport with known science, the accused athlete 
can still be found guilty of a doping offense,304 rendering the 
presumption used to build the case against an athlete to be 
effectively irrebuttable. The strength of these presumptions is 
reflected in USADA’s amazing record in cases it brings against 
athletes—it has won nearly every one and has deterred countless 
other athletes from even bringing a challenge. 
These aspects of the procedures provided to athletes are 
particularly troubling because, in the case of an “analytical” positive 
(a doping offense found through drug testing in a lab), the only 
opportunity for an innocent athlete to know what happened so that 
he or she could present a defense is to obtain an explanation from 
the WADA-controlled laboratory. Thus, in seeking a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, athletes are left with little opportunity to 
defend themselves because the facts that control the finding that 
there was a doping violation are within the control of doping 
regulators, who have the sole authority to create the tests, certify 
results, and then declare a violation. This is quite unlike a typical due 
process case, where the opportunity to be heard is made more 
meaningful because the facts that control the government’s decision 
often rest exclusively or at least equally with the aggrieved 
individual.305 In the doping regulation context, the facts and law are 
 
that the labs training of its employees “lacked vigor” and the errors caused did “give some 
cause for concern,” but that nevertheless, these flaws did not result in Landis’s positive finding. 
Id. at 81. The tests themselves are also in question due to the stringent requirements. For 
example, the EPO test requires more than twenty-four hours to complete, numerous 
complicated steps, sophisticated equipment and a high level of technical skill. In spite of the 
rigorous steps, the results of the EPO test are highly susceptible to interpretation, and do not 
produce a clear result. There are allegations that the test is prone to “false positives.” Hiltzik, 
supra note 12; Shipley, supra note 297 (“[T]he current blood test for HGH has significant 
shortcomings.”). 
 304. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, 4, at 76–77 (explaining that despite the “39 
different errors within the lab documentation package,” the errors did not cause Landis’ 
positive result, and therefore he was still found guilty of a doping offense). 
 305. For instance, in Goss v. Lopez, the Court discussed the students’ right to tell 
administrators their side of the story and to bring facts to light that might otherwise have been 
overlooked. 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). Similarly, in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, the hearing served the purpose of allowing Loudermill an opportunity to explain 
why he omitted his prior felony conviction from his employment form. 470 U.S. 532, 544 
(1985). Similarly, in Mathews v. Eldridge, a Social Security Disability benefits recipient was 
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controlled by regulators.306 Therefore, the risk of an erroneous result 
for an innocent athlete is great because the “facts” of the doping 
offense, as they happened, are only in the control of doping 
authorities. Without broad ability to get documents from the 
laboratories and obtain exculpatory testimony from those who 
perform the tests,307 an athlete is left with little means to be heard. 
As stated by one of the arbitrators in the Floyd Landis proceeding: 
“[A]s this case demonstrates, even when an athlete proves there are 
serious errors in a laboratory’s document package that refute [the 
positive finding], it will be extremely difficult for an athlete to prevail 
in these types of proceedings.”308 
The risk that the presumptions used in the Code will produce an 
erroneous and unjust result is heightened by the standards used to 
ban athletes from competition. The USADA, relying on the World 
Anti-Doping Code, has stated that it can ban athletes based on 
 
given the opportunity through a hearing to show that he was, in fact, disabled under the 
meaning of the statute. 424 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1976). 
 306. David Black, the president and chief executive of a large independent doping lab not 
affiliated with WADA, stated that when 
you have a closed system where very few people in the world know what the science 
is, and the system has a vested interest to make sure its findings are confirmed . . . 
the lab should just be a fact-gatherer, but the WADA system is designed in a way 
that the labs are not just objective fact gatherers, but part of the body of 
prosecution.  
Hiltzik, supra note 12. This “stacked deck” nature of the process afforded to athletes leads 
many to forego an appeal and simply take their suspension. For instance, swimmer Rachael 
Burke tested positive for trace amounts of boldione, an anabolic steroid, that she believed may 
have come from a tainted nutritional drink. She had never previously tested positive. She was 
concerned that trying to fight the allegation would cost tens of thousands of dollars and had 
little chance of success, so she simply agreed to a two-year suspension that took her out of 
world-class swimming. Id. 
 307. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 5–6 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (Campbell, arb., dissenting). 
It was disclosed during the hearing that Laboratory Directors are bound by an 
Ethics Code of Conduct that has been interpreted to preclude them from disclosing 
the errors of one of their fellow laboratories on behalf of an athlete. In other words, 
if a laboratory had made an error and that error was causing an innocent athlete to 
be convicted of a doping offense, they could not testify on behalf of the athlete and 
disclose the error. . . Dr. Ayotte admitted that because of this provision she would 
not testify for an athlete even if she knew that a WADA accredited laboratory made 
a mistake. 
Id. Indeed, in the Landis arbitration, it was noted that none of the three laboratory directors 
involved in the case, who had reviewed the data, disclosed any of the problems with the data 
used to support the doping allegation in that case. Id. at 7. 
 308. Id. at 22. 
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circumstantial evidence if the evidence “comfortably satisfied” 
doping regulators that a violation had taken place.309 This use of 
circumstantial evidence is often referred to as a “non-analytical 
positive,”310 and is considered to be the equivalent of a failed drug 
test.311 Although they had never failed a drug test, numerous 
Olympic athletes were banned from competition based on this type 
of government-provided evidence.312 This low threshold for finding a 
doping offense is coupled with the strict-liability nature of doping 
regulations.313 Punishment for unintentional use of a banned 
substance is often indistinguishable from that for intentional use.314 
Anti-doping officials find this feature to be essential, despite the 
potential for highly inequitable results. In the words of the outgoing 
head of the World Anti-Doping Agency: “if you’re captured by a 
squad of Nazi frogmen and injected with a steroid, you’re going to 
be found positive.”315 This strict liability system and the 
“comfortable satisfaction” standard together leave athletes with little 
room to clear their name.316 While standing alone, the strict liability 
 
 309. WADA Code, § 3.2.1 Comment; Tom Weir, Runners in the Cross Hairs, USA 
TODAY, June 9, 2004, at 1C. Officials have further explained that this standard is certainly less 
stringent than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, but more than a “mere balance of 
probabilities.” Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and 
Circumstantial Evidence Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 193, 203 (2006). 
 310. The circumstantial evidence is primarily composed of documentary evidence which 
might include calendar entries, drug schedules, or canceled checks. 
 311. Linda Robertson, A Sport Comes Clean, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 2004, at C8. 
 312. Terrence Madden, supra note 137 (explaining that the USADA won “all 13 cases” 
prosecuted using documents provided by the Senate Committee in connection with the 
BALCO grand jury investigation and that “you subpoenaed those documents from the 
Department of Justice . . . and over 9000 documents were delivered to USADA. They have 
been used in prosecutions to date, they will be used in further prosecutions”). 
 313. Doping regulators assert that there is a powerful justification for the strict liability 
standard, specifically the compelling need to protect the integrity of sport for all competitors. 
Moreover, regulators note that requiring a showing of intent before a sanction could be 
imposed would “invite costly litigation” that would “cripple” sporting federations. WADA 
Code § 2.1.1 cmt. 2.1.1. 
 314. See WADA Code § 4.4 (directing that substances on the prohibited list shall not be 
subject to challenge by an athlete or other person based on an argument that the substance or 
method was not a masking agent or did not have the potential to enhance performance, 
represent a health risk, or violate the spirit of sport); Hiltzik, supra note 12 (citing the example 
of sprinter Torri Edwards who was suspended for two years despite the arbitrators in her case 
acknowledging “[s]he has not sought to gain any improper advantage or to ‘cheat’ in any 
way”). 
 315. Hiltzik, supra note 12 (quoting former WADA Chairman Dick Pound). 
 316. See WADA Code § 3.1. The dissenting arbitrator in the Floyd Landis hearing 
concluded: 
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standard might be justified because of the exigencies of the 
worldwide fight against doping, the standard, taken with the other 
presumptions built into the Code, unduly risks an unjust result. 
Thus, the difficulty in prevailing against a doping charge, even if an 
athlete is innocent, is due to the presumptions in support of and 
standards for finding a doping offense at work in the Code. These 
presumptions and standards alter the nature of the adjudication to 
such a degree that the procedures not only unduly risk an erroneous 
result, they actively promote the value of conviction and punishment 
more than they respect the athlete’s right in his or her eligibility. 
Because the value of punishing and appearing “tough” on doping 
does not require accurate adjudications, the procedures used 
intentionally do not serve the accuracy and fairness values that the 
due process clause guarantees. 
Doping regulators’ lack of consistency in following their own 
rules is an additional aspect of anti-doping regime which threatens 
athletes’ due process rights. As explained above, a key component of 
due process is following the established rules.317 In the doping 
enforcement context, regulators often fail to follow established rules, 
especially in cases involving high-profile athletes. The failure to 
follow established procedures in the testing process itself, as 
discussed above, is particularly problematic because it is presumed 
that procedures are followed. When established procedures are not 
followed, the athlete is denied due process because the presumption 
operates to prevent an athlete from meaningfully defending her or 
himself, and also because failing to follow established rules is in itself 
a due process violation. Thus, the presumption of following 
 
Because everyone assumes an athlete who is alleged to have tested positive is guilty, 
it is not fashionable to argue that laboratories should comply with strict rules. 
However, if you are going to hold athletes strictly liable with virtually no possibility 
of overcoming a reported alleged positive test even in the face of substantial and 
laboratory errors, fairness and human decency dictates [sic] that strict rules be 
applied to laboratories as well.  
Id.; U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, 4, at 11 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (Campbell, arb., dissenting). 
 317. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1983); Yellin v. U.S., 374 U.S. 109, 143–
44 (1963); Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1980); Mathews 
v. Walter, 512 F.2d 941, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the 
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1109 (1984) (“Numerous cases extending into 
the post-Roth era affirm the principle of rule obedience.”) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 
199, 235 (1974)). 
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established procedures, compounded with the blatant failure to 
follow such procedures, seriously risks an erroneous result.  
Moreover, failure to follow established rules for “result 
management” also presents a due process problem. For instance, the 
World Anti-Doping Code mandates that positive test results are to 
be kept confidential until an athlete has had notice and a chance to 
defend the allegation. In the case of high-profile athletes, however, 
such as Floyd Landis, Justin Gatlin, and Marion Jones, the results 
were leaked before they were confirmed and testing on the athletes’ 
“B” sample was complete. In Landis’s case, the dissenting arbitrator 
noted that “[a]t every stage of the testing, the results from the 
testing of Mr. Landis’ samples were leaked to the media” in violation 
of the WADA code.318 The arbitrator went on to explain how 
damaging these leaks could be, because “within twenty-four hours 
after the [lab] obtained the results, and before anyone other than the 
[lab] had the results, the results of the B sample tests were leaked to 
the media,” which significantly damaged Landis’s reputation and put 
in jeopardy his ability to be heard in a meaningful way. “[L]eaking 
this information was clearly meant to damage Mr. Landis’s credibility 
before an independent tribunal had the opportunity to evaluate the 
evidence.”319 
The case of Marion Jones is also a useful example. In 2006, a 
leak to the press indicated that Jones had failed a drug test at the 
United States National Track and Field Championships.320 It was 
widely reported that Jones had used erythropoietin (EPO), an 
endurance-boosting drug.321 The leaked results forced her to pull out 
 
 318. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, 4, at 11. 
 319. Id. at 12. A similar opinion was voiced in the case against cyclist Tyler Hamilton. 
Before his hearing, doping officials made numerous public statements regarding Hamilton’s 
guilt and called into question his entire career as a cyclist. The dissenting arbitrator in the case 
stated in his opinion that “if it is at all desirable for athletes to believe they will obtain a fair 
hearing, it is imperative that high-ranking officials within the Olympic community refrain from 
making statements demonstrating bias against an athlete before that athlete has a hearing.” He 
also stated that “athletes should not have to worry that high ranking officials are sending clear 
messages to the arbitrators to find the athlete guilty regardless of the facts of the case.” U.S. 
Anti-Doping Agency v. Hamilton, AAA No 30 190 00130 05, at 6-7. 
 320. See WADA Code § 14.2 (stipulating that public disclosure of adverse results may be 
released “no earlier than the completion of the administrative review”). 
 321. Amy Shipley, Jones is Cleared of Drug Violation: Former Olympian’s “B” Sample is 
Negative, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006 [hereinafter Shipley, Jones is Cleared] (“[A]nti-doping 
officials do not officially release A sample results because of the possibility the B won’t support 
the A, but Jones’s results were leaked.”). 
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of several meets and eventually cancel her season322 at a time when 
she was the second-ranked 100-meter sprinter in the world.323 It was 
later revealed that testing on Jones’s “B” sample had not confirmed 
the result of the “A” sample,324 and she was cleared of a doping 
violation.325 Despite the fact that she was cleared, Jones’s reputation 
was significantly damaged.326 In the case involving Olympic and 
world 100-meter champion Justin Gatlin, there was a similar, highly 
public, rush to judgment. After it was announced that Gatlin had 
failed a drug test, but before Gatlin had an opportunity for a hearing 
(his defense was that he was sabotaged), WADA Chairman Dick 
Pound was quoted as saying that Gatlin “needs to be banned for up 
to life,” and that WADA would review the result of any hearing if 
“we are not satisfied the right result has been achieved.”327 
The final aspect of the administration of the World Anti-Doping 
Code that prevents athletes from meaningfully protecting their 
sporting careers is that the system, at a minimum, appears biased. 
The Supreme Court has stated that a fundamental requirement of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision 
maker.328 Moreover, commentators have stressed that “traditional 
 
 322. Amy Shipley, Jones Says She’s in No Condition to Race, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006 
(“I was in top condition when my season was interrupted more than three weeks ago by the 
leak of my positive test. I was ready but missed top competitions . . . . Unfortunately, I just 
don’t feel that my condition is there.”). 
 323. Shipley, Jones is Cleared, supra note 321.  
 324. USADA has established a standardized procedure for collecting samples. All athletes 
are closely observed during the actual provision of the sample. The sample is then split between 
two bottles which are labeled “A” and “B” and given a unique code number. Athletes are 
instructed to inspect and secure the samples with their signature over a seal. If the “A” sample 
returns a positive result, the athlete may request that the “B” sample be tested before any 
disciplinary measures are taken. USADA, Doping Control Process (2008), available at 
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/process/processing.html. 
 325. Shipley, Jones is Cleared, supra note 321 (quoting Jones’s attorney that the reported 
positive on the “A” test was controversial, in that it was “right on the threshold” of a positive 
result). Critics say such discrepancies, which have happened in other cases, are due to the 
complexity of the test for EPO and the fact that some say the test cannot always distinguish 
artificial EPO from naturally produced EPO. See id. 
 326. Amy Shipley, Inquiry into Jones’s Test Results, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006 (noting 
that Jones’s attorney stated that “if this is the climate, that every high-profile [athlete’s] A 
sample is leaked, you better make sure the test works”). 
 327. See Liz Byrnes, Anti-Doping Chief Calls for Life Ban on Sprint Ace Gatlin, W. MAIL, 
July 31, 2006, at 9. 
 328. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972)). The Supreme Court has further explained that the general rule is that 
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procedural protections, however meticulously adhered to, become 
irrelevant” when the decision maker is not neutral.329 Such a 
requirement is essential to prevent “unjustified or mistaken 
deprivations” and to help ensure that “life, liberty, or property will 
not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of 
the facts or the law.”330 In this regard, the due process offered by 
anti-doping authorities falls short. As a threshold matter, athletes 
challenging an eligibility decision resting on a doping allegation are 
not permitted to avail themselves of the arbitration procedures 
provided for under the Amateur Sports Act.331 Instead, athletes 
requesting arbitration must accept the “Supplementary Procedures” 
provided by USADA for use in arbitration proceedings.332 This is 
troubling not only because it circumvents the Amateur Sports Act, 
but because the USADA-approved arbitrators form a much smaller 
pool from which to draw arbitration panels. This limited pool is pre-
approved, paid, and “trained” by USADA.333 As a result, critics have 
stated that the arbitrators listed as qualified to hear doping cases are, 
or appear to be, biased.334  
Similarly, to the extent that laboratory authorities who perform 
the tests and declare the results can be viewed as decision makers 
(and they should, given that the World Anti-Doping Code presumes 
their work is accurate), their neutrality is called into question because 
of their relationship with WADA and USADA. For instance, one of 
 
“even purportedly fair adjudicators ‘are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be 
decided.’” Id. at 538 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927)). 
 329. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 477 (1986). 
 330. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
 331. Those procedures require that an athletes’ National Governing Body “submit to 
binding arbitration in any controversy involving . . . the opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . 
to participate in amateur athletic competition, upon demand of . . . any aggrieved amateur 
athlete . . . conducted in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association . . . .” 36 U.S.C. § 220522(4); Bylaws of the United States Olympic Committee § 
9.1. 
 332. See United States Anti-Doping Agency Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing § 
10(a); Jacobs v. USA Track & Field, 374 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 333. Leslie Ann Dougiello, Note, Jacobs v. United States Track & Field, 24 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 887, 891 (2006). In contrast to the USADA-approved pool, the pool provided for 
under the Commercial Rules are not selected and trained by USADA. See also Michael 
Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1223 (2005). 
 334. Straubel, supra note 255, at 1223. 
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the laboratory directors called to testify on the accuracy of the results 
in the Landis proceeding by USADA was also a recipient of a $1 
million grant from USADA for research.335 Another prominent 
laboratory director, in testifying on the WADA “Code of Ethics” 
provision that prohibits laboratory personnel from engaging in 
“conduct . . . detrimental to the anti-doping program,” stated that 
he was rebuked by WADA after testifying on behalf of an athlete.336 
This laboratory director is also the recipient of research funding from 
USADA. This differs markedly from cases where the Supreme Court 
has found hearing procedures satisfactory to protect an individual’s 
property right. For instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court 
emphasized that the evidence upon which authorities would 
determine whether to discontinue disability benefits was derived 
from “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists,”337 which did not raise “the specter of questionable 
credibility and veracity . . .”338 This is quite unlike the anti-doping 
procedures. The appearance, if not the reality, of bias at various levels 
of the anti-doping system denies athletes a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard and defend their sporting careers. In the words of one 
critic: “[a]nti-doping authorities act as prosecutor, judge and jury, 
enforcing rules that they have written, punishing violations based on 
sometimes questionable scientific tests that they develop and certify 
themselves, while barring virtually all outside appeals or 
challenges.”339  
Although the vast majority of drug tests and resulting 
adjudicatory proceedings on athletes in sports with a low 
international profile may be conducted according to the rules, 
sportive nationalism can provide a strong incentive to waive 
procedural protections for high-profile athletes so the United States 
can appear aggressive on the issue of doping.340 Moreover, even 
 
 335. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 11 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (Campbell, arb., dissenting). 
 336. Id. at 6. 
 337. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1976). 
 338. Id. at 344. 
 339. Michael Hiltzik, Athletes’ Unbeatable Foe, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 340. See Vicki Michaelis, BALCO Creates Inquiry Road Map, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2006 
(explaining that “catching” Floyd Landis and Justin Gatlin is “helping to lift the black marks 
 . . . on the U.S. image globally . . .” and that “[a]t a time when the U.S. Olympic Committee 
is contemplating a bid for the 2016 Summer Games, that offers some comfort”). 
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when doping regulators “follow the rules” as written, those rules, 
with strong United States Government backing, fall short of 
meaningful due process. The interest that appears to anchor the 
procedures provided for accused athletes is not the interest in 
minimizing the risk of an erroneous or unjust result, but an interest 
on the part of doping regulators to demonstrate that the United 
States is “tough” on doping. By serving primarily this interest, the 
procedures provided to accused athletes fall short of due process 
requirements because they do not operate to minimize the chance of 
an erroneous result, but instead stack the deck in a way that actually 
increases the chance of such an erroneous result. Indeed, the USADA 
has only lost one arbitration hearing in its history.341 
In summary, the procedures here fall short of what is due 
because they are not meant to ensure accuracy and prevent an 
erroneous result. They are meant to ensure convictions and burnish 
the image of countries like the United States who sign on to the 
Code. The rules in fact can act to shield potentially arbitrary and 
capricious action by doping regulators by severely limiting the extent 
an accused athlete can defend himself. The result is that athletes are 
in actuality left with little procedural protection through which they 
can clear their name. A hearing where a party, because of procedural 
rules, cannot clear his name not only unjustifiably risks an erroneous 
result, it in some cases guarantees it and therefore falls far short of 
providing the process that is due. Given that athletes are no longer 
amateurs in the traditional sense, but are individuals pursuing 
sporting careers, this process is not sufficient.342 
 
 341. Hiltzik, supra note 12. LaTasha Jenkins recently won an arbitration case against the 
USADA because of faulty procedures used to test her sample. Press Release, Valparaiso School 
of Law, LaTasha Jenkins and Valpo Sports Law Clinic Win Case Against U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.valpo.edu/law/news/121407.php.  
 342. As stated in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), the determination of due process rights, “under any given 
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government 
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by government 
action.” Many Supreme Court decisions serve to emphasize that when substantial private 
interests are affected, as is arguably the case with these Olympic athletes, by governmental 
action, procedural due process demands “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
This notice and opportunity for hearing “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Examples of due 
process requirement in sport include Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 
1481 (D. Or. 1994) (injunction was proper when NGB did not follow requirement that a 
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IV. ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY IN OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
SPORTS 
Achieving accountability for sportive nationalism and better 
protecting athletes’ constitutional rights begins with the recognition 
that sportive nationalism exists and is at work in the federal 
government’s policies and practices. Given this country’s history of 
ignoring the relationship between sport and international relations, 
such recognition would be an important first step. Thus, the 
awareness that sportive nationalism can create troubling incentives 
for unchecked government involvement in the United States 
Olympic Movement, as well as the accountability failures of the 
current Olympic Movement structure, presents an opportunity to 
rethink the prevailing, and now outdated, view that participation in 
Olympic Movement sport is a purely private endeavor. To that end, 
this Article begins the dialogue of searching for accountability 
solutions. 
As a starting point, any recommendation should maintain the 
integrity of our participation in international regimes such as the 
International Olympic Committee and the World Anti-Doping 
Agency. These entities serve the United States interest, and their 
regulation of Olympic Movement sport should not be undermined. 
Accordingly, potential solutions should seek to balance the interests 
of individual athletes and the undeniable national interest that is 
implicated through our participation in the Olympic Movement. 
A. Accountability Through the Public Sector 
Perhaps the ideal accountability solution for sportive 
nationalism’s excesses is through constitutional litigation. This 
solution is ideal because it does not rely on an electorate which likely 
is caught up in the same sportive nationalistic impulses as 
government officials. In this way, courts can truly be independent 
and do what they purport to do best—protect individual rights. 
Accountability can be achieved through the courts with a more 
 
hearing be set at a time reasonably convenient for all parties); Schulz v. U.S. Boxing Ass’n, 105 
F.3d 127, 136 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an athlete possesses a contractual right to have a 
governing body follow its own rules); Lindemann v. Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc., 624 N.Y.S. 
2d 723, 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the suspension of an athlete was arbitrary and 
capricious because determination was not made without a meaningful hearing or substantial 
evidence). 
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flexible and pragmatic application of the state action doctrine, so that 
the USOC and USADA, ostensibly “private” entities, can be held to 
constitutional standards in circumstances where the federal 
government has directed their actions. A state action finding would 
have the benefit of applying the Constitution to actions of the 
USOC or USADA only in particular cases where sportive 
nationalism—by definition the work of the government—had 
eclipsed the entities’ “private” status. Such an approach would be 
targeted in that it would only apply to the individual circumstances 
of a particular case.343 Whether a court would apply the Constitution 
to the USOC or USADA in an athlete-eligibility dispute is an open 
question, although in some circumstances the USOC and USADA 
may engage in state action.344 
Aside from the courts imposing constitutional restrictions on the 
USOC and USADA through the state action doctrine, one obvious 
solution to achieving greater accountability for sportive nationalism 
is to make the USOC and the USADA government agencies, similar 
to the government entities, or “sports ministries” that regulate 
Olympic Movement sport in other Olympic super-power nations. In 
this way, sportive nationalism would not be filtered through 
ostensibly private entities, but it would be clearly connected with its 
government source. Making the USOC and USADA a part of the 
government would ensure that athletes receive constitutional due 
process and other protections and would therefore remove the 
accountability vacuum presented by the privatized Olympic 
Movement.  
However, unlike application of the state action doctrine in 
specific circumstances, such an approach would be an overly broad 
and dramatic response to sportive nationalism, even if it were 
politically viable. The USOC by and large functions well as a private 
entity, and its legal separation from the federal government provides 
at least some shield against excessive sportive nationalism. The 
example of the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycott illustrates this 
shield. The USOC’s private status enabled it to advocate for the 
athletes, and for participation in the Games, and resist the pressure 
 
 343. See Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001) 
(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil. Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)) (explaining that the state 
action inquiry is “necessarily fact-bound,” and depends on particular facts and circumstances). 
 344. Koller, supra note 132, at 93. 
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from the Carter Administration to boycott. Although ultimately this 
was unsuccessful, it still illustrated that the USOC, acting as a private 
entity, has the opportunity to influence public opinion and attempt to 
create the political pressure to resist sportive nationalism that is 
potentially threatening to athletes’ rights. 
While it may make sense, on balance, for the USOC to remain 
private, it is worth exploring whether the USADA should formally be 
made a part of the United States Government. It is in the fight 
against performance-enhancing drug use in sport that sportive 
nationalism has taken a more threatening form so that it is not so 
easily deemed benign. One approach then is to make the regulation 
of performance-enhancing drugs a function of the government, 
perhaps administered through the ONDCP, which provides 
USADA’s funding. In the alternative, USADA could operate as its 
own federal agency. Making the USADA a government agency has 
the obvious advantage of ensuring that athletes accused of doping 
violations always receive constitutional due process protections. 
Making the USADA a government agency would also have an 
important secondary benefit, in that it would promote greater 
stability in the movement to fight performance-enhancing drug use 
in sport. Currently, USADA relies on the support of key members of 
Congress345 to provide continued, and increased, funding for 
USADA’s work. Moreover, it is not formally part of the United 
States Olympic Movement in that it is not mentioned in the 
Amateur Sports Act. While the United States’ national interest 
clearly favors supporting USADA at this juncture, it is hardly clear 
whether this will continue.346 Given USADA’s dependence on 
government funding, such a relatively precarious position does not 
ensure the long-term stability of doping initiatives the way making 
 
 345. Most prominently, Senators John McCain and Ted Stevens have been at the 
forefront of advocating for the establishment and continued funding of the USADA. See 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/2005/05/24/john_mccain050524.html (last visited Nov. 
15, 2008). 
 346. See Houlihan, supra note 22, at 75 (“[C]ommitment to anti-doping policy might 
lessen if the perceived utility of international sport diminishes or if the opportunity cost is seen 
as too great. There are already one or two countries where the amount of public money being 
spent on doping control is being challenged on the grounds that it exceeds the sum devoted to 
encouraging mass participation. Alternatively, commitment to drug-free sport might be 
reduced because of a desire to maintain the existing levels of success.”); Statement of Robert 
Housman in Panel II: Regulations Governing Drugs and Performance Enhancers in Sports, 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 367 (2002) (questioning whether the 
United States Government will keep “momentum” on fighting doping in sport).  
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USADA a government agency would. Moreover, such an approach is 
consistent with our need for our elite athletes to demonstrate what is 
good and right about the United States form of government. Unlike 
totalitarian regimes, regulating Olympic Movement sport, or at a 
minimum the anti-doping process, through the government does 
not undermine our free-market image. It enhances our image as a 
nation committed to individual rights. 
Yet, similar to the approach of making the USOC a government 
agency, bureaucratizing the USADA suffers from the obvious flaw 
that it is politically not viable. This is not simply because the 
prevailing political ideology is in favor of privatization. It is also 
because the federal government does not want to give accused 
athletes constitutional protections that would potentially impede the 
aggressive enforcement of anti-doping rules.347 Sportive nationalism, 
in this case, would defeat any attempt to make the USADA part of 
the federal government. 
B. Achieving Accountability Through the Private Sector 
Given that making the USOC and the USADA a formal part of 
the government likely is not a viable or effective solution to checking 
sportive nationalism, it is worth exploring private sector 
accountability mechanisms. One way to examine potential 
accountability mechanisms is to view the Olympic Movement in the 
United States as a privatized government service. Viewed this way, 
understanding sportive nationalism’s potential impact on individual 
rights can usefully be examined through the lens of privatization 
theory.348 
Privatization “entails the transfer of governmental functions to 
the private sector.”349 Privatization can take various forms, with the 
 
 347. See supra, text accompanying notes 148–57.  
 348. In discussing privatization, Ellen Dannin asserts that the issue is not how to make 
private service providers accountable, “but, rather, does the issue of accountability help us 
understand how a service should be provided.” Dannin, supra note 159, at 151. 
 349. Michele Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 569, 594 (2001). See also Martha Minow, Symposium: Public Values in an Era of 
Privatization: Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1230 (2003) (“Although the term ‘privatization’ covers a variety of different 
activities, a useful definition encompasses the range of efforts by governments to move public 
functions into private hands and to use market-style competition. Current privatization efforts 
involve both for-profit and nonprofit organizations—including religious entities—in 
performing public responsibilities or addressing public needs.”). 
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most common being “contracting out,” whereby the government 
provides funding for services but contracts for the implementation 
with the private sector.350 Privatization is not a new phenomenon, 
but it has gained greater appeal and become an established 
movement among political conservatives.351 While some privatization 
gains little public attention, such as local governments contracting 
out their trash collection services, other privatization initiatives raise 
significant concern.352 A primary argument for privatization is that 
the private sector can provide a higher quality service in a more cost-
effective manner.353 In addition, advocates assert that privatization 
harnesses the power of competition to create incentives for 
“innovation and increased efficiency.”354 
Critics note, however, that privatization risks the “dilution of 
public values” in that important public norms such as due process 
and free speech do not attach to private actors.355 Most of this 
concern has centered on privatization of traditional government 
social service areas such as welfare and education.356 Thus, critics 
question whether the private sector can provide meaningful 
accountability when individual rights are involved.357 Those who 
prefer free-market solutions for the provision of government services 
believe the market best provides accountability.358 Those who are 
concerned with social and economic justice “believe that those values 
are better protected by public rather than private methods of 
 
 350. Gilman, supra note 349. 
 351. Jody Freeman, Symposium: Public Values in an Era of Privatization: Extending 
Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291–92 (2003) (“In the 
last two decades, privatization has been championed by conservative policymakers, academics, 
and public intellectuals as instrumental to reducing the size of government and broadly 
restructuring society in line with a conservative agenda. Privatization coincides with other 
political and economic developments—including globalization, free trade, market integration, 
and deregulation—that similarly reinforce an ideological preference for private over public 
ordering and market over noneconomic values.”). 
 352. Gilman, supra note 349; Minow, supra note 349, at 1242. 
 353. Minow, supra note 349, at 1242. 
 354. Id. at 1243. 
 355. Id. at 1247 (“The result may improve efficiency and reduce costs, but it may also 
vitiate public values.”). 
 356. Id. at 1230. 
 357. Dannin, supra note 159, at 113 (“[A]rguments for or against privatization are 
actually about accountability.”). 
 358. Id.  
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accountability.”359 In terms of using privatization to achieve 
government goals, it is widely accepted that it is not legitimate to 
privatize in an effort to avoid being subject to constitutional 
restraints.360 
At first blush, the USOC may not appear to be a classic case of 
privatization, like schools, prisons, or other social services.361 
Privatization really concerns moving “public functions into private 
hands,”362 and in this way, the development and regulation of 
Olympic Movement athletes does not fit the classic privatization 
scenario. The Supreme Court has held that regulating amateur 
athletics is not a “traditional public function” for state action 
purposes,363 and the government has always left Olympic Movement 
regulation to the private sector. As a result, it can be argued that 
Olympic Movement regulation has not been privatized like the 
provision of welfare benefits or education. 
However, upon closer examination, it is both appropriate and 
helpful to view Olympic Movement sport as a privatized function. 
The Olympic Movement in the United States serves dual functions. 
First, there is the important task of developing and regulating 
Olympic Movement athletes. This function historically has been 
performed by the private sector. However, there is another use for 
the Olympic Movement in the United States. As explained above, 
the Olympic Movement serves an important foreign relations 
function which clearly always has been the province of the federal 
government. Thus, when the federal government went from being 
neutral on the use of elite athletes to enhance national prestige to 
recognizing, in the Commission Report and the Act, that 
participation in the Olympic Movement can provide a significant 
national benefit, it essentially “privatized” that aspect of foreign 
relations. Justices Brennan and Marshall recognized as much in their 
dissent in San Francisco Arts, where they stated: 
Although at one time amateur sports was a concern merely of 
private entities, and the Olympic Games an event of significance 
 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 123–24 (“Most would agree privatization should not be used as a tool to 
avoid being subject to the law.”). 
 361. Gilman, supra note 349; Minow, supra note 342, at 1230. 
 362. Minow, supra note 342, at 1230. 
 363. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987). 
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only to individuals with a particular interest in athletic competition, 
that era is passed. In the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Congress 
placed the power and prestige of the United States Government 
behind a single, central sports organization. Congress delegated to 
the USOC functions that Government actors traditionally 
perform—the representation of the Nation abroad . . . .364 
Justices Brennan and Marshall further underscored this point, 
stating that “the [Amateur Sports] Act gave the USOC authority 
and responsibilities that no private organization in this country had 
ever held.”365 Accepting then that Olympic Movement regulation is, 
in a sense, a privatized government function, it is helpful to examine 
the ways in which accountability may be achieved when sportive 
nationalism plays out through the private sector, to the detriment of 
athletes’ individual rights. 
1. Accountability through the market 
Proponents of privatization assert that the market provides all the 
accountability that is needed.366 Such an argument, however, loses 
force in the case of a single provider which faces no market 
competition.367 The Amateur Sports Act created a monopoly for 
Olympic regulation by eliminating the ability of organizations such 
as the NCAA and the AAU to claim authority to field Olympic 
Movement teams.368 In addition, USADA enjoys a monopoly as it is 
the only entity to receive a grant from Congress to regulate 
performance-enhancing drug use in United States Olympic 
Movement sport. Congress also designated USADA as the United 
States’ official anti-doping agency.369 This removes the possibility 
 
 364. Id. at 559–60. 
 365. Id. at 557. 
 366. Dannin, supra note 348, at 118 (“Privatization proponents argue that we can rely 
on the market to provide all necessary oversight and controls in addition to lower cost and 
better quality products.”) 
 367. Id. at 598 (noting that the most important factor for not losing accountability with 
privatization is competition). 
 368. Indeed, the sports market has been described as a “natural monopoly,” in that there 
is “‘a single seller, a unique product and barriers to easy entry to the market.’” See Simon 
Gardiner, Mark James, John O’Leary & Roger Welch, SPORTS LAW 52 (3d ed. 2006) (quoting 
Kevin Foster, How Can Sport Be Regulated?, in LAW AND SPORT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
268–70 (Steve Greenfield & G. Osborn eds., 2000). 
 369. The USADA Web site defines itself as “the independent anti-doping agency for 
Olympic related sport in the United States.” USADA—Who We Are: USADA History, 
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that additional entities could easily enter the market and compete to 
provide anti-doping services for the United States Government. With 
no opportunity for market accountability, other accountability 
mechanisms should be explored. 
2. Accountability through the political system 
Privatization proponents argue that privatization will very likely 
carry with it a fair amount of political accountability because the 
conduct of private entities carrying out the public’s work will be 
closely scrutinized.370 However, this is not the case with the USOC 
or USADA practicing sportive nationalism on behalf of the 
government. The high-profile Moscow Olympic boycott is 
instructive, as it produced little in the way of political fallout. The 
public strongly supported the President’s decision to boycott the 
Olympic Games.371 Indeed, some of the athletes themselves thought 
this was the best course.372 The majority of athletes, however, tried 
to fight the decision, with little success.373 The USOC also tried to 
fight the boycott, but its argument to attend the Olympic Games 
and beat the Soviets on their home turf had little impact.374 The 
American media also “played an active part” in supporting the 
boycott, as few media outlets argued against it.375 More recently, 
during the Democratic presidential primary campaign in 2007, 
Governor Bill Richardson stated that the United States should 
boycott the 2008 Summer Olympics in China if China did not agree 
 
http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.html (emphasis added); see also Office of National 
Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–469, § 701(b)(1), 120 
Stat. 3502, 3534 (2006). 
 370. Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1734 (2002) (“The fact that privatization is likely to be politically 
controversial means that its effects are likely to be muted with close scrutiny of privatized 
entities and strong demands for increased regulation or deprivatization if serious failures 
occur.”). 
 371. VINOKUR, supra note 16, at 116 (“[There was] a ground swell of public and 
editorial opinion in favor of the action, as indicated in the polls. In an election year, Carter may 
have wished to demonstrate his will to resist Soviet aggression.”). 
 372. Id. at 117 (noting that Olympic runner Craig Masback was in the minority by 
supporting the boycott). 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 119 (noting that support of the boycott was the position of “most major U.S. 
media” and that, with respect to foreign relations, “when the government calls, the media is 
the first to report for duty” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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to use its leverage with Sudan to help end the conflict in Darfur.376 
In a blog on the issue, many citizens readily agreed, illustrating that 
using athletes to make foreign policy points is not politically 
controversial.377 Even those who disagreed with the notion of a 
boycott saw a role for athletes in foreign policy—they thought the 
athletes should be used as “ambassadors.”378 
Outside the realm of a boycott, which is a very high-profile, 
obvious expression of sportive nationalism, there is little indication 
that most Americans even see sportive nationalism at work in the 
federal government’s involvement in Olympic Movement athletics. 
As explained above, the media and the American public often ignore 
the relationship between sport and international relations.379 The 
example of the anti-doping movement illustrates the disconnect well. 
Most individuals see doping in sport as a moral issue, not an 
international relations issue. Actions taken against athletes in this 
regard, therefore, are filtered through the lens of right and wrong, 
and not expedient international politics. Additionally, in the United 
States, interest in Olympic Movement sport is second to professional 
sports. Thus, while there might be political fallout for government 
action against Major League Baseball or the National Football 
League, there likely would be little for an Olympic swimmer or 
pentathlete. Accordingly, the electorate is largely uninformed, or 
under-informed, on the various levels at which Olympic Movement 
athletes serve the national interest.  
Moreover, the American consumers of elite athletic competition 
care a great deal about protecting their vision of the United States 
and their vision of how the United States should be perceived, or 
should act, on the international stage.380 To the extent issues of sport 
translate at all into political action, the American electorate is likely 
 
 376. Edward Luce & Andrew Ward, Democratic Rivals United in Tough Line on Beijing, 
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at 5. 
 377. CNN.com politicalticker, Boycott Beijing Olympics?, June 3, 2007, http:// 
politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/06/03/richardson-on-darfur-us-should-boycott-beijing-
2008-olympics/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 16, at 259. 
 380. See Drug Free Sports Act Hearing, supra note 115, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Cliff 
Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection). (“[Steroid 
use] cheats our sports . . . and it cheats all of us as fans . . . . [W]e are all here today as fans who 
want to protect the sports that we care so very much about.”). Stearns also explained that 
“sport, both amateur and professional, belongs to all of us here in America.” Id. 
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therefore to see the issue in terms of their own nationalism, and not 
in terms of the experience of the elite athlete. As the Darfur bloggers 
illustrate, using Olympic Movement athletes can be an important 
vehicle to express our own sense of morality and nationalism. As one 
blogger stated: “[S]ince when has winning gold medals been more 
important than saving human lives?”381 Another suggested that “the 
ATHLETES themselves should refuse to participate in the Olympics, 
if China refuses to help end the conflict in Darfur.”382 One blogger 
summed up: “[W]hy boycott the Olympics? We could virtually shut 
China down if we stopped shopping at Walmart. Oh, no! Wait, that 
would hurt me, not just some athlete on TV. Yeah, let’s stick with 
the Olympics . . . .”383 As the last blogger noted, critics are more 
readily able to propose foreign policy strategies, such as boycotting 
the Olympics, that do not affect them personally, but are not as 
willing to propose solutions that would have an impact on them. On 
the flip side, it is not clear that policy makers always view public 
opinion as important on issues related to the practice of sportive 
nationalism.384 This is because the government sees the issue as 
primarily affecting its own foreign relations interests and likely sees 
little risk of the electorate “throwing the bums out” over issues 
related to Olympic athletes. Accordingly, an uninformed public 
combined with unresponsive political leaders cannot provide 
meaningful political accountability for sportive nationalism. 
3. Increased “publicization” 
Some privatization commentators suggest that, in fact, privatized 
entities may be subject to a great deal of government supervision and 
monitoring for compliance with performance standards.385 For 
instance, Professor Jack Beermann argues that privatization of 
important government functions “is likely to entail extensive public 
monitoring of the private institutions involved.”386 Beermann uses 
the examples of private prisons in Texas and Tennessee, which he 
 
 381. CNN.com politicalticker, supra note 377. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Houlihan, supra note 21, at 76 (explaining the political disconnect with the issue of 
the anti-doping movement: “[T]here is also no sign that policy-makers perceive public support 
as an important factor” in the anti-doping movement). 
 385. Beermann, supra note 370, at 1719. 
 386. Id. at 1726. 
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argues are “subject to a very high level of scrutiny” in that the prison 
operators must operate within specific parameters established by the 
state.387 Additionally, Beermann cites the example of charter schools, 
which he argues “may actually be more heavily regulated in some 
respects than traditional public schools in that they can be abolished 
for failing to meet performance standards much more easily than 
traditional public schools.”388 
The increased accountability of the private actors cited in 
Beermann’s examples, however, do not apply to the Olympic 
Movement. While the USOC has been subject to a great deal of 
oversight with respect to ethical improprieties and management 
structure, for example,389 Congress has never held hearings on 
whether the federal government’s use of Olympic Movement athletes 
to enhance national prestige violates athletes’ rights. The case of the 
USADA is particularly telling. In hearings to support continued 
funding for the USADA, one of the items generally cited in support 
of such funding is that the anti-doping agency is taking “aggressive” 
action and enhancing the United States’ international prestige.390 
Congressional oversight has almost never focused on the specifics of 
how this is being achieved.391 Given that the government has such a 
 
 387. Id. (noting that the prison contractors must file reports with the state and may lose 
the contract to operate their respective prisons if they do not meet certain standards). In 
addition, the prison operators are prohibited, by statute, from raising the defense of sovereign 
immunity in defense of any lawsuit arising out of the operation of the prison. Id. 
 388. Id. at 1728. 
 389. See generally Olympic Family—Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (2005); Legislative Efforts to Reform the U.S. Olympic Committee: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); Does the U. S. Olympic Committee’s Organizational Structure 
Impede its Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 390. S. 529, to Authorize Appropriations for the U.S. Anti–Doping Agency: Hearing on S. 
529 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 109th Cong. 3–4 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hearing to Authorize Appropriations] (testimony of Jim Scherr, Chief Executive 
Officer, U.S. Olympic Committee) (stating that USADA has “largely dispelled what was 
previously a widespread international impression that some American athletes were drug 
cheaters” and that the USADA is doing the job it was created to perform and in doing so has 
become the model national anti-doping agency and organization for the world). 
 391. Indeed, the emphasis is on protecting the rights of “clean” athletes. See Sports Act, 
supra note 134, at 16 (testimony of Frank Shorter, Former Chairman, U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency) (“[USADA’s] function is to protect the rights of clean athletes by conducting its 
testing and adjudication programs with integrity and transparency to stop those athletes who 
dope and then hold them accountable for their decision to use these drugs.”). Only once did 
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strong national interest in using the USADA to meet its objectives, it 
is unlikely that a searching review of some of the USADA’s 
questionable practices will take place. 
Since extensive oversight and monitoring of the Olympic 
Movement, at least with respect to how sportive nationalism might 
affect athletes’ rights, does not take place, the next question is how 
increased monitoring could be put in place. The key concern for 
critics of privatization is that by relying on private provision of 
services, the government can avoid constitutional obligations that it 
would have if it provided the service directly.392 One solution to this, 
posed by Jody Freeman, is that privatization can be viewed as a 
means of actually expanding government into traditionally private 
realms—so-called “publicization.”393 Freeman asserts that the 
government can use its leverage to impose conditions on the private 
entities with whom it contracts so that the private actors would 
commit themselves to traditional public values such as accountability, 
equality, and due process.394 In this way, privatization can actually be 
a vehicle to extend the application of these important values. 
The USOC and USADA are promising candidates for such an 
approach. With respect to the USOC, Congress already requires it to 
report in detail on its operations, including an accounting of income 
and expenditures.395 In addition, the USOC must report on the 
“participation of women, disabled individuals, and racial and ethnic 
minorities” and include a “description of the steps taken to 
 
Congress inquire into USADA’s procedural protections for athletes, in a question by Senator 
John McCain asking about Marion Jones’s accusation that the USADA was a “secret kangaroo 
court.” Hearing to Authorize Appropriations, supra note 390, at 22. Terrence Madden of the 
USADA quickly dismissed this accusation, stating that “[o]ur procedures in regards to the 
legal aspects are foolproof” and that athletes “have all the inherent rights within the United 
States justice system.” Id. at 22 (testimony of Terry Madden, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. 
Anti-Doping Agency). This testimony was not challenged or otherwise followed up by any 
member of the committee. Id. 
 392. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1309 (2003) (“[I]t is the transition from government to private provision that the 
public law perspective finds problematic, especially when considered cumulatively, because it 
allows government to avoid obligations it would undertake if it provided services directly.”). 
 393. Id. at 1285–86. 
 394. Id.; see also Beermann, supra note 370, at 1735 (“Just as the federal government 
attaches strings, in the form of federal standards, to the money it provides to state and local 
governments, so too is government likely to attach strings to the government money that ends 
up in the hands of privatized entities.”). 
 395. 36 U.S.C. § 220511(a)(1) (2000). 
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encourage” their participation in amateur athletics.396 This reflects 
the type of “publicization” that Freeman argues for, in that Congress 
is requiring the USOC to extend the value of equality to its 
operations and be accountable for it. Building on this, at a minimum 
Congress could amend the Amateur Sports Act to require that the 
USOC report on ways in which it is offering sufficient due process 
protections to athletes. While such reporting would not guarantee 
that athletes receive more protection for their eligibility than they 
currently enjoy, it would send an important message that such 
protection is important. 
In addition, requiring more of the USADA, given the substantial 
federal funds that support it, would be warranted. Thus far, the 
federal government’s legislation with respect to USADA has been 
directed more at the international community than at USADA’s 
domestic performance. For instance, as described above, the USADA 
is “designated” as the United States’ official anti-doping agency.397 
Such a designation has little domestic legal effect, but it does enable 
USADA to participate in international anti-doping regimes as a 
representative of the United States, which serves to enhance the 
United States’ image abroad.398 As a result of this designation, 
Congress requires the USADA to “serve as the independent anti-
doping organization for the amateur athletic competitions 
recognized by the United States Olympic Committee.”399 Congress 
also requires the USADA to prevent Olympic athletes from using 
performance-enhancing substances or gene-doping by implementing 
education, research, and testing programs.400 Beyond that, however, 
USADA’s statutory obligations are very little.401 
 
 396. 36 U.S.C. § 220511(a)(3) and (4). 
 397. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109–469, § 701(b)(4), 120 Stat. 3502, 3534 (2006). 
 398. Koller, supra note 132, at 100 (2005) (quoting from ONDCP’s National Strategy 
to combat drug use in sports); Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109–469, § 701(b)(4), 120 Stat. 3502, 3534 (2006) (providing that the 
United States Anti-Doping Agency shall “serve as the United States representative responsible 
for coordination with other anti-doping organizations”). 
 399. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109–469, § 701(b)(1), 120 Stat. 3502, 3534 (2006). 
 400. Id. § 701(b)(3). 
 401. USADA additionally is required to “keep correct and complete records of account” 
and submit an annual report to Congress. Id. § 702(a)–(b)(1). 
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Similarly, USADA’s obligations through its receipt of 
government funds are minimal. In the first several years of its 
existence, the USADA was funded through memoranda of 
understanding between ONDCP and USADA. These memoranda 
simply directed ONDCP to make a direct payment of the 
congressionally allotted funding to “advance USADA’s anti-doping 
mission.”402 USADA’s “responsibilities” under the memoranda were 
to “manage the drug testing and adjudication process for U.S. 
Olympic, Pan Am, and paralympic athletes.”403 USADA further 
agreed to use the funds only for anti-doping purposes and “maintain 
adequate records of all expenditures and obligations.”404 The FY 
2004 Memorandum of Understanding contained the most 
requirements for USADA: in addition to those mentioned in 
previous years, the funding was to be used “to increase the number 
of ‘No-Advanced-Notice’ tests, to increase research funding at 
university and research laboratories, and expand their efforts to 
educate the youth of America on health issues and the ethics of 
competing fairly in sport.”405 At a minimum, USADA’s obligations 
in receiving federal funding should extend to following all WADA 
and USADA protocol with respect to testing and adjudication. 
Additional requirements could be added as necessary to remedy 
persistent reports of irregularities, such as those evidenced in high-
profile cases. Moreover, Congress should strongly consider 
amending the Amateur Sports Act to place USADA within that 
scheme, which clearly includes protections for athletes such as the 
right to arbitration under the Commercial Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. This would eliminate the appearance of bias 
and unfairness that inheres in the use of USADA’s “Supplementary 
Procedures” for arbitration, which circumvents the protections for 
athletes given by the Act. 
 
 402. See Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the Executive Office of the 
President Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and United States Anti-Doping 
Agency, (Dec. 11, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter MOU 2002]; MOU between the 
Executive Office of the President ONDCP and USADA (March 20, 2003) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter MOU 2003]; MOU Between the Executive Office of the President 
ONDCP and USADA (Feb. 5, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter MOU 2004]. 
 403. MOU 2002, supra note 402; MOU 2003, supra note 402; MOU 2004, supra note 
402.  
 404.  MOU 2002, supra note 402; MOU 2003, supra note 402; MOU 2004, supra note 
402. 
 405.  MOU 2004, supra note 402. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
More than thirty years ago, the debate was over how, and how 
much, the federal government should use Olympic Movement sport 
in international relations. Now that sportive nationalism is a part of 
the United States’ foreign policy, the question has become how to 
ensure that it is not practiced in a way that threatens athletes’ 
constitutional rights. Unlike Cold War Era athletes, Olympic athletes 
of today can claim a property right and liberty interest in their 
sporting careers sufficient to trigger meaningful due process 
protections when a doping accusation threatens their eligibility. 
Accordingly, understanding what sportive nationalism is, and the 
incentives it creates, is an important step toward achieving 
accountability for potential violations of athletes’ rights in the name 
of securing international prestige. In devising accountability 
mechanisms, we should return to the foundation that guided early 
expressions of sportive nationalism by constructing an American 
Olympic Movement that embodies important American values. 
Those values, it is clear, must encompass more than the spirit of free 
enterprise and moral superiority, but a healthy respect for individual 
rights as well. 
